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LICENSE TO OFFEND: HOW THE NLRA SHIELDS 
PERPETRATORS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
WORKPLACE 
Molly Gibbons* 
Abstract: Congress established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) 
to enforce the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) and ensure fair labor practices 
in workplaces across the United States. The NLRA protects employees from discipline while 
engaging in union activity. Under the NLRA, employers and unions must collectively bargain 
in good faith. Either party may only walk a a  from he able hen ano her par s cond c  
makes good fai h bargaining impossible. Ho e er, he NLRB s de ermina ion of ha  cond c  
constitutes bad faith bargaining and protected union speech is inconsistent with federal anti-
discrimination laws. This discrepancy means employers cannot take affirmative steps to 
prevent hostile work environments. This Comment proposes a new approach: the NLRB 
should harmonize its decisions delineating speech protected under the NLRA versus speech 
that may create a hostile work environment and thus subject the employer to further liability 
under federal anti-discrimination laws. Union speech or conduct that rises to the level of 
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) should be considered 
o side he scope of he NLRA s pro ec ions, e en if i  does no  reach he c rren  s andard for 
bad faith bargaining or unprotected speech. This Comment argues that such harmonization 
should apply irrespective of whether the offensive conduct comes from an employee or 
nonemployee union member. 
INTRODUCTION 
An emplo er s managemen  eam mee s i h a gro p of nion 
represen a i es o nego ia e ne  ear s collec i e bargaining agreemen . 
The first few days of bargaining proceed without issue, but then the 
unexpected happens: A member of the union team begins to harass and 
act aggressively towards a member of the managerial team. The union 
representative calls the member of the managerial team names, insults her 
looks and intelligence, gets increasingly close to her while yelling, and 
uses racial and sexual slurs. This goes on for a few days. Everyone 
engaged in bargaining is a are of his member s cond c  and he  do no  
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I want to thank Mary Fan 
and Hugh Spitzer for their insight and input into this Comment. I would also like to thank the Editorial 
Staff of Washington Law Review for their hard work and insightful comments, especially Monica 
Romero, Robert Morgan, Ian Walsh, and R.K. Brinkmann. This Comment uses offensive, sexually 
and racially charged language from various cases for the purpose of illustrating the severity of the 
speech that has been protected under the NLRA. However, this Comment has censored racial and 
sexist slurs. 
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feel like they can effectively bargain for a new contract while the harasser 
is present. To protect a member of their team and make sure they can 
bargain in good faith, the management team wants to end bargaining
but this is impossible. The team must negotiate until bargaining rises to 
the level of bad faith, wherein good faith bargaining becomes impossible 
d e o he par s presence.1 Moreover, if the union representative also 
happens to be an employee, the employer cannot reprimand them for their 
improper behavior because they are likely engaged in protected union 
speech. If the union member is no  an emplo ee, he emplo er s onl  
recourse would be to remove them from the property or refuse to bargain. 
However, if the managerial team took either action, essentially walking 
away from the bargaining table, the employer would risk an unfair labor 
practice claim. If the employer loses on this claim, it may face a financial 
penalty and an order to continue negotiations until an agreement is 
reached. Therefore, the employer is in a tough situation: Should it risk an 
unfair labor practice charge by the union, or a harassment lawsuit from its 
employee? 
Under National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)2 
preceden , an emplo er s d  o bargain is discharged onl  hen an 
indi id al s cond c  q alifies as bad fai h bargaining.3 In certain 
circumstances, this precedent allows employees to remain protected under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)4 even when engaging 
in profane, racist, or sexist outbursts.5 However, such conduct may violate 
federal anti-discrimination laws under which employers have a legal 
obligation to prevent and correct harassment in the workplace.6 Congress 
did not give the NLRB unfettered discretion to enforce the Act in ways 
that potentially conflict with federal s a es and policies nrela ed o he 
                                                     
1. See Pan Am. Grain Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing KDEN Broad. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 
25, 35 (1976)); see also infra section II.B.  
2. The NLRB is the federal agency responsible for enforcing the National Labor Relations Act in 
relation to collective bargaining agreements and unfair labor practices. Who We Are, NAT L LAB. 
RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/78KT-XZFZ]. 
3. See Fitzsimons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375, 379 (1980), aff d sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 670 
F.2d 663, 664 (6th Cir. 1982). 
4. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69. 
5. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272 (1974) (noting that the 
free heeling se of he ri en and spoken ord [d ring labor disp es] . . . has been expressly 
fos ered b  Congress and appro ed b  he NLRB ).  
6. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 29 (2013); see also Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 
358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1263 (2012), vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ( The Board has recogni ed 
that employers have a legitimate business interest in investigating facially valid complaints of 
emplo ee miscond c , incl ding complain s of harassmen .  (ci ing Consol. Diesel Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 
1019, 1020 (2000), enforced, 263 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2001))).  
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NLRA. 7 The conflict between the NLRB s preceden  and federal la s 
places employers in difficult situations where their obligations under the 
NLRA may put them at risk of civil liability under federal anti-
discrimination laws. 
This Comment examines the current legal and regulatory frameworks 
for determining bad faith bargaining and protected union speech, 
specifically in relation to workplace harassment under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).8 Part I outlines the history of speech 
in the union context and the development of the doctrine of protected 
union speech. Part II explores the duty to bargain under the NLRA. It also 
addresses the concept of bad faith bargaining how it discharges the duty 
to bargain and how the standard for it has evolved over the years. Part III 
describes the standard for actionable workplace harassment under federal 
anti-discrimination law and the conflict with NLRB precedent for 
evaluating speech. Part III also examines how outlooks on harassment 
have evolved drastically over time. Part IV argues that the NLRB must 
continue to reconsider its protection of speech or conduct that would 
otherwise be actionable under federal anti-discrimination laws. Although 
the NLRB issued a new decision in July 2020 that partially disavowed its 
ref sal o consider emplo ers  righ  o main ain a respec f l orkplace, 
the opinion did not address how offensive conduct from a nonemployee 
nion represen a i e o ld affec  an emplo er s d  o adhere o i s 
obligations under federal antidiscrimination laws and the duty to bargain 
nder he NLRA. Harmoni ing he NLRB s s andards i h federal an i-
discrimination laws across all contexts and parties would ensure efficient, 
respectful bargaining and workplace conversations. 
I. SPEECH IN THE UNION CONTEXT 
Throughout its history, the NLRB has liberally interpreted the 
appropriateness of workplace speech arising from protected union 
activity.9 Workers have used this leeway to zealously advocate for union 
members  in eres s i ho  fear of an i-union retaliation.10 Once speech is 
no longer protected by the NLRA, employers may discipline an employee 
                                                     
7. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002) ( The United 
S a es S preme Co r  does no  defer o he Na ional Labor Rela ions Board s remedial preferences 
where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the National 
Labor Relations Act. ); see infra Part IV. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
9. See Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005) (quoting Winston-Salem J., 341 
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (2004), enforcement denied sub nom. Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 394 
F.3d 207, 208 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
10. See Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975); Stanford, 344 N.L.R.B. at 564. 
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for their actions, even if it occurred while engaged in union activity. This 
Par  addresses he NLRA s pro ec ion of nion speech ha , in some 
situations, has prevented employers from disciplining employees who 
engaged in harassing conduct. This Part also walks through the various 
tests that the NLRB uses to analyze whether union speech loses protection 
of the NLRA and the exceptions that favor protecting such speech. 
A. The National Labor Relations Act 
One of the primary statutes that creates protections for worker and 
union speech is the NLRA,11 which Congress enacted as a part of the New 
Deal in 1935.12 The law represented a shift in workplace regulation and 
set strict limits on employer rights in an effort to support and protect 
collective worker action. The NLRA pro ec s orkers  nion-related 
speech and prohibits private employers from discriminating against or 
disciplining workers for engaging in union activity.13 The Act also 
guarantees emplo ees he righ  o self-organi a ion  and es ablishe[s] a 
system by which the government would certify unions and require 
emplo ers o bargain collec i el  i h orkers. 14 Section 7 of the NLRA 
sets out the rights of employees to engage in union activities like 
bargain[ing] collec i el  hro gh represen a i es of heir o n choosing  
along i h concer ed ac i i ies for he p rpose of collec i e bargaining 
or o her m al aid or pro ec ion. 15 
Following the passage of the NLRA, Congress established the NLRB 
to enforce its provisions.16 Section 8(a) of the NLRA prohibits employers 
from interfering with, restraining, coercing, or discriminating against 
                                                     
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69. 
12. Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace 
Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2422 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69). 
13. Id. (noting that these protections are only statutory, not rooted in the first amendment); id. at 
2420 n.17 ( Emplo ee speech is pro ec ed b  sec ion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act when it 
in ol es concer ed ac i i ies  for he p rpose of orkers  m al aid or pro ec ion.  The righ  o free 
speech as a form of concerted activity . . . may not be bargained away by union negotiators. Moreover, 
the Court has ruled that the Act includes as concerted activity speech aimed at improving the 
circumstances of a group of employees, even when the issue is not specific to contract negotiations. 
In order to trigger the protections of the Act, worker speech must be either entwined with worker 
group action or involve preparation for such action. In addition, the employer must be aware of the 
concer ed ac i i .  (citations omitted)). 
14. Id. at 2422 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).  
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
16. 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-
nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act [https://perma.cc/S7SK-U5YX]. 
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employees exercising their section 7 rights.17 The NLRB enforced this 
provision b  no  allo ing emplo ers o in erfere i h emplo ees  abili  
to unionize any retaliation against union activity by an employer was 
considered an unfair labor practice under the Act.18 
B. Determining When Speech Loses Protection of the NLRA 
While the NLRA seeks to protect concerted activity by employees, the 
NLRB has es ablished bo ndaries for he Ac s speech pro ec ions o er 
time. The NLRB has set forth multiple tests for determining the limits of 
section 7 s pro ec ions.19 Under each of the tests, the Board applies an 
objec i e s andard o de ermine he her an indi id al s s a emen  or 
conduct represents a physical threat.20 The Board does not consider the 
subjective interpretation of the parties present for the outburst.21 As the 
NLRB General Counsel noted, the Board treats racist and sexist speech 
the same way it treats other vulgar or profane language: it applies different 
tests depending on the situation in which the outburst occurred.22 The 
Board primarily considers the context or location in which the speech 
occurred as well as the severity of the speech itself. 
An employee may lose the protection of the Act depending on whether 
they engage in indefensible or abusive conduct as well as the overarching 
context of their conduct.23 For example, the Board has devised tests for 
evaluating whether protection has been lost based on if the conduct 
occurred in the workplace, outside of the workplace, or during union 
ac i i  like picke ing. Ho e er, he NLRB s in erpre a ion of he Ac  
allo s a cer ain degree of la i de  o emplo ees engaged in pro ec ed 
                                                     
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (3). 
18. Id. § 158(a)(1), (5). It is an unfair labor practice o in erfere i h, res rain, or coerce emplo ees 
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7  of the NLRA. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
19. Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (applied for workplace outbursts); Pier Sixty, 
LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 531 (2015) (citing Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (2001)) 
(applied to situations occurring outside the workplace); Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 
1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985) (applied to outburst made on the picket 
line). The Atlantic Steel test is most commonly used as it applies across the most situations.  
20. See, e.g., Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 25 & n.2, 27 29 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (finding that the Board was correct in noting that the employee s comment that the supervisor 
better bring [his] boxing gloves  was not meant literally and was not reasonably threatening). 
21. Id. 
22. Brief of NLRB Gen. Couns. as Amicus Curiae at 10, Gen. Motors LLC & Charles Robinson, 
368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter NLRB General 
Counsel]. 
23. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 2011).  
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cond c , e en hen emplo ees e press hemsel es in empera el . 24 
The NLRB has e plained ha  i  pro ec s offensi e, lgar, defama or  
or opprobrio s remarks ered d ring he co rse of pro ec ed ac i i ies  
beca se he lang age of he shop is no  he lang age of poli e 
socie . 25 
The Board set forth a four-factor test in Atlantic Steel Co.26 for inter-
workplace outbursts to determine when union speech loses its protection 
under the NLRA.27 Atlantic Steel applies o si a ions in ol ing direct 
communications, face-to-face in the workplace, between an employee and 
a manager or s per isor. 28 The es  balances: (1) he place of he 
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the 
emplo ee s o b rs ; and (4) he her he o b rs  as, in an  a , 
pro oked b  an emplo er s nfair labor prac ice. 29 No abl , hile no  
every impropriety . . . places the employee beyond the protective shield 
of he [A]c , 30 his lee a  m s  be balanced agains  an emplo er s righ  
                                                     
24. Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005) (quoting Winston-Salem J., 341 N.L.R.B. 
124, 126 (2004), enforcement denied sub nom. Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 394 F.3d 207, 
208 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
25. Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309, 315 (1975). The Board, while acknowledging 
that tempers may run high in this emotional field, that the language of the shop is not the language 
of poli e socie ,  and ha  olerance of some de ia ion from ha  hich migh  be he mos  desirable 
behavior is required, has held that offensive, vulgar, defamatory or opprobrious remarks uttered 
d ring he co rse of pro ec ed ac i i ies ill no  remo e ac i i ies from he Ac s pro ec ion nless 
they are so flagrant, violent, or extreme as to render the individual unfi  for f r her ser ice.  Stanford, 
344 N.L.R.B. at 564 (quoting Dreis, 221 N.L.R.B. at 315).  
26. 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
27. Id.  
28. Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 311 (2014); see also Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 
No. 123, slip op. at 10 (May 6, 2019) ( The Board has typically applied the analysis of Atlantic Steel 
to situations where face-to-face orkplace con ersa ions ha e been alleged o infringe on emplo ers  
righ s o main ain orkplace order.  (citations omitted)). 
29. Atl. Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816; see e.g., Stanford, 344 N.L.R.B. at 558 59 (2005) (finding that 
the employee did not lose Act s protection when calling the manager a liar  and a b[***]h,  angril  
poin ing a finger a  him, and repea ing ha  he as a f[**]king son of a b[***]h  beca se he o b rs  
occurred while the employee was asserting a fundamental right, it was a direct and immediate reaction 
o emplo er s hrea s of discharge, and occ rred in a secl ded room a a  from he emplo ee s ork 
area); Felix Indus., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 195, 195 97 (2003) (finding that the employee did not lose 
pro ec ion of he Ac  b  referring o he s per isor as a f[**]king kid  hree times over a phone call 
in which employee asserted his contract rights, and where circumstances make clear that the outburst 
o ld no  ha e occ rred b  for emplo er s pro oca ion, incl ding a hrea  of ermina ion for 
engaging in protected activity).  
30. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 (2014) (quoting NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 
351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965)). While the actual text of the NLRA says nothing about protecting 
profane, racially charged, or sexual language or behavior, the Board in Atlantic Steel determined that 
the NLRA protects such behavior under the provision in section 7 which guarantees employees the 
righ  o engage in o her concer ed ac i i ies for . . . other mutual aid or protection . . . .  29 U.S.C. 
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to maintain order and respect. 31 
In addressing the location factor, the Board clarified that where the 
outburs  occ rs is significan  hen balancing he emplo ee s righ  o 
engage in section 7 ac i i  agains  he emplo er s righ  o main ain 
order and discipline  in he orkplace.32 Board decisions reflect a 
dis inc ion be een o b rs s here here as li le if any risk that other 
emplo ees heard he obsceni ies and hose here ha  risk as high. 33 In 
Atlantic Steel, he Board no ed ha  an emplo er s in eres  in main aining 
order in he orkplace is affec ed less b  a pri a e o b rs  in a 
manager s office away from other employees than an outburst on the work 
floor i nessed b  o her emplo ees. 34 An employee is more likely to lose 
the protection of the NLRA when they engage in a public outburst, noticed 
by others.35 However, when the employer initiates a confrontation in a 
public setting, the Board will not hold this factor against the employee.36 
Under the second factor, a dispute is likely protected when it involves 
a discussion of key working conditions, like wages and workplace safety 
complaints, grievances, or terms of a collective bargaining agreement.37 
The Board reasons that such disputes are likely to produce strong, highly 
emo ional responses and par ies ill of en speak bluntly and 
recklessly. 38 Because tensions often run high during these conversations, 
he NLRA s pro ec ions would be seriously threatened if the employer 
could  insis  ha  an  emo ional and arg men a i e poin  made d ring he 
                                                     
§ 157. 
31. Pipe Realty Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290 n.3 (1994) (citing Thor Power Tool, 351 F.2d at 
587). 
32. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978 (quoting Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 292 
(9th Cir. 2011)). 
33. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 679 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 2012)); see Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 10 (May 6, 2019) ( The Board has fo nd ha  an emplo ee s 
outburst against a supervisor in a place where other employees could hear it would tend to affect 
workplace discipline by undermining he a hori  of he s per isor.  (quoting Kiewit Power 
Constructors Co., 355 N.L.R.B. 708, 709 (2010))). 
34. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978.  
35. See id. 
36. See Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22, 25 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (accepting 
the Board s reasoning that while quarrels with management are more likely to disturb the workplace 
if they are made in front of fellow workers, the NLRB will not hold this against the employee when 
the company picks a public scene for what is likely to lead to a quarrel ). 
37. See Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 979; Greyhound Lines, slip. op. at 5. 
38. Linn v. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) (noting that parties to these disputes 
often embellish[] their respective positions with imprecatory language ); see Consumers Power Co., 
282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986); USPS, 360 N.L.R.B. 677, 682 (2014); Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 
978 79.  
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discussion could lose the protection of the NLRA.39 
When evaluating the third factor, the Board analyzes the nature of the 
o b rs  b  aking in o acco n  he emplo ee s s a emen s, ho he 
employee confronted, whether they made any threats or physically hit 
an one, and he emplo ee s his or  of aggression.40 The Board has noted 
that [i]  is possible for an employee to have an outburst weigh against 
him e  s ill re ain [ he NLRA s] pro ec ion beca se he o her hree 
[Atlantic Steel] factors weigh heavily in his favor. 41 Additionally, NLRB 
precedent reflects the principle that an outburst is less severe when the 
s bjec  of he profani  is an emplo er s polic , ra her han he emplo er 
itself.42 The Board also considers orkplace norms and an emplo er s 
tolerance of profanity in the workplace when analyzing whether the nature 
of the outburst weighs in favor of protection.43 
Finall , hen de ermining if he emplo ee s o b rs  as pro oked, 
the Board considers the timing of the outburst, the absence of prior similar 
miscond c , and managemen s hos ili  o ards he emplo ee s 
protected conduct.44 O b rs s are more likely to be protected when the 
emplo er e presses hos ili  o he emplo ee s er  ac  of complaining 
than when the employer has indicated a willingness to engage on the 
merits. 45 Further, threats of discharge are often considered adequate 
                                                     
39. USPS v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).  
40. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977 80. 
41. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977 (finding that the nature of the outburst weighed against 
protection because the outburst, which included comments like the employer would regre  i  if he 
as fired and calling he emplo er a f[**]king mo her f[**]ker,  a f[**]king crook,  and an 
a[**]hole,  as an obscene and denigra ing, face-to-face, ad hominem attack against an employer 
at work (citing Kiewit Power, 652 F.3d at 27 n.1); Greyhound Lines, slip op. a  10 ( Al ho gh 
insubordina e cond c  eighs agains  pro ec ion nder he Ac , he Board dis ing ishes be een r e 
ins bordina ion  and beha ior ha  is onl  disrespec f l, r de, and defian .  (citing Goya Foods, Inc., 
356 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (2011))). 
42. See Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 977; Greyhound Lines, slip. op. at 5; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
341 N.L.R.B. 796, 806 08 (2004) (concluding that the employee retained the protection of the Act 
where employee used the profanity to describe the employer s policy and its effects rather than to 
describe a member of management), enforced, 137 Fed. App x 360 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
43. See Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1061 (1982) (employee s profane 
o b rs  as pro ec ed beca se he se of profani  b  hospi al personnel as no  
uncommon . . . and had been olera ed in he pas ), enforced, 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983); Corr. 
Corp. of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 632, 636 (2006) (emplo ee s se of profani  as pro ec ed here 
profani ies ere commonl  sed a  he facili  b  [emplo ees] and s per isors alike ). 
44. See Felix Indus., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 195, 196 97 (2003). 
45. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 979 (comparing Overnite Transp. Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1437 
(2004) (finding employee s speech protected where the employee did not bring up the subject of 
whether supervisor had committed wartime atrocities until after supervisor had refused to discuss the 
employee s workplace concerns) with DirectTV U.S. DirectTV Holdings, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 545, 
559, 562 (2013) (concluding that the employee s profane outburst weighed against protection in part 
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provocation for an emplo ee s o b rs weighing in favor of protection 
under the NLRA.46 
In cases involving statements made outside of the workplace from one 
employee to another for example, statements made online the Board 
applies a o ali  of he circ ms ances  anal sis.47 This analysis 
encompasses the Atlantic Steel factors, along with workplace policies, 
norms, discipline patterns, anti- nion hos ili , and he emplo ee s 
previous conduct48: 
(i) whether the employer maintained a specific rule prohibiting 
the language used by the employee; (ii) whether the employer 
generally considered language such as that used by the employee 
o be offensi e; (iii) he her he emplo ee s s a emen  as 
impulsive or deliberate; (iv) whether the discipline imposed upon 
the employee was typical of that imposed for similar 
violations . . . ;(v) whether the discipline was clearly directed at 
offensive language as opposed to protected activity; (vi) whether 
the record contains any record of antiunion hostility; and (vii) 
whether the employee had previously engaged in similar 
protected conduct without objection.49 
Finally, the NLRB applies the Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.50 test in cases 
involving picket-line speech directed at employees, which examines 
he her he miscond c  is s ch ha , nder he circ ms ances e is ing, i  
may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of 
rights protected under the [NLRA]. 51 
                                                     
because the employee had already been told that the problem that he was again complaining to 
management about would be resolved in a few days)). 
46. Plaza Auto, 360 N.L.R.B. at 978 ( Telling an employee who is engaged in protected concerted 
ac i i  ha  he ma  q i  if he does no  like he emplo er s policies is an implied hrea  of discharge, 
because it suggests that continuing to engage in such protected activity is incompatible with continued 
emplo men . ); see also McDaniel Ford, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 956, 962 (1997) ( [A]n emplo er s 
invitation to an employee to quit in response to their exercise of protected concerted activity is 
coercive, because it conveys to employees that [engaging in] concerted activities and their continued 
emplo men  are no  compa ible, and implici l  hrea en[s] discharge of he emplo ees in ol ed. ). 
47. Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1267 (2012), vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); see Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 747 49 (2001); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 
505, 531 (2015); Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 311 (2014) ( [T]he A lan ic S eel framework is 
ailored o orkplace confron a ions i h he emplo er. ). 
48. Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 531. 
49. Id. (citing Honda, 334 N.L.R.B. at 748).  
50. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).  
51. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046; see also Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 
810, 812 (2006) (no ing ha  he Board has fo nd ha  a s riker s se of he mos  ile and lgar 
language, including racial epithets, does not deprive him of the protection of the Act, so long as those 
actions do no  cons i e a hrea ); De roi  Ne spaper Agenc , 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 268 (2004) 
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When anal ing he na re and se eri  of he emplo ee s o b rs  
under the above tests, the Board often applies two principles: the realities 
of industrial life and the norms of the workplace.52 The Board is more 
illing o find ha  an emplo ee s speech is pro ec ed nder he NLRA if 
that speech is representative of the realities of industrial life or tolerated 
within the specific workplace.53 
1. Realities of Industrial Life 
The Board has consis en l  applied a reali ies of ind s rial life  
principle hen e al a ing he her an emplo ee s profani  or offensi e 
language loses protection under the NLRA.54 This principle implies that 
profanity, vulgarity, or obscenity in the course of labor relations is 
presumptively permissible in any industrial workplace.55 The Board has 
insisted that the protections section 7 affords emplo ees o ld be 
meaningless  if i  did no  o ake in o acco n  he reali ies of ind s rial 
life and the fact that disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions 
are among the disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and strong 
responses. 56 While much has changed since the passage of the NLRA, 
the Board continues to find that the language of the workplace is not 
considered he lang age of poli e socie . 57 Additionally, the Board 
has obser ed ha  passions r n high in labor disp es and ha  epi he s 
and acc sa ions are commonplace. 58 Accordingl , a cer ain amo n  of 
sal  lang age and defiance  is o be e pec ed and m s  be olera ed  in 
disp es o er emplo ees  erms and condi ions of emplo men . 59 For 
                                                     
(finding an employee s speech pro ec ed hen he  said o  f[**]kin  b[***]h, n[****]r lo in  
h[*]re  during a strike). 
52. See infra section I.B.1. 
53. See infra section I.B.1. 
54. See Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986). Federal courts have also appeared 
to honor this exception. See NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 07 (7th Cir. 1971).  
55. Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1269 (2012) (Member Hayes, dissenting), 
vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 978 79 (2014). 
56. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. at 132. 
57. Stanford N.Y., LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 564 (2005); see Kiewit Power Constructors Co., 355 
N.L.R.B. 708, 710 (2010) ( [T]he Board has fo nd ha  a line is dra n be een cases where 
employees engaged in concerted activities that exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in a moment of 
animal exuberance or in a manner not motivated by improper motives and those flagrant cases in 
which the misconduct is so violent or of such a character as to render the employee unfit for further 
service. ). 
58. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 18 (May 6, 2019) (citing Atl. Steel 
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 819 (1979)).  
59. Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting Severance Tool Indus., 301 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170 (1991), enforced, 
953 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
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example, Consumers Power Co.60 involved an employee who was upset 
over unsafe work conditions and protested to his supervisor.61 The 
employee used abusive profanity against the supervisor, shook his finger 
in he s per isor s face, and s pposedl  s r ck he s per isor in he 
chest.62 Since he emplo ee s ac ions occ rred in he hea  of he momen , 
while the employee was protesting the safety of work conditions, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they were protected under 
section 7 of the NLRA.63 Likewise, in Greyhound Lines, Inc.,64 the ALJ 
held ha  he NLRA shielded he emplo ee s o b rs , hich in ol ed 
sho ing profani ies like f[**]k o ,  because he was engaged in union 
activity and his language was not so egregious as to lose protection under 
the Act.65 The ALJ made clear that his finding was consis en  i h he 
Board s reasoning ha  a cer ain amo n  of sal  lang age and defiance  
is to be e pec ed and m s  be olera ed  in disp es o er emplo ees  
erms and condi ions of emplo men . 66 
2. Norms of the Workplace 
The Board also applies he norms of he orkplace  principle hen 
de ermining if an emplo ee s o b rs  is pro ec ed b  he NLRA.67 
Specificall , he Board looks a  he her profani  [or obsceni ] is 
commonplace and tolerated  in he orkplace.68 If it is, the nature of the 
outburst supports retaining protection of the Act because a profane 
                                                     
60. 282 N.L.R.B. 130 (1986). 
61. Id. at 130 31. 
62. Id. at 131. 
63. Id. at 137. The ALJ noted that the employee s action was a reflexive reaction and that physical 
con ac , if an , as modera e and amo n ed o no hing more han Knigh s hand br shing agains  
S per isor C rrie s ches . There as no a emp ed blow, threatening gesture, or threatening words by 
Knight and no other contact between the two men occurred.  Id. The Board affirmed he ALJ s 
decision, noting that 
Knigh  raised his fis s o C rrie refle i el , responding o C rrie s mo ing his hands in front of 
Knigh  as if o ges re or shake a finger in Knigh s face. Knigh  as admi edl  ho  nder he 
collar  . . . [but] never struck a blow . . . . We like ise do no  find Knigh s la er cond c  so 
egregious as to lose the protection of the Act now. 
Id. at 132. 
64. 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (May 6, 2019). 
65. Id.  
66. Id. (quoting USPS, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. a  4 (J l  29, 2016) ( In addi ion, he Board 
and he co r s ha e recogni ed ha  some olerance is necessar  if grie ance mee ings are o s cceed 
a  all,  and br ised sensibili ies ma  be he price e ac ed for ind s rial peace.  (q o ing USPS . 
NLRB, 652 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981))).  
67. Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 5, 2019). 
68. Id.  
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outburst is considered less distressing and disruptive to the work 
en ironmen  and he manager s abili  o main ain order.69 NLRB 
decisions imply that profanity in the course of labor relations is a 
permissible norm in most workplaces.70 In Traverse City Osteopathic 
Hospital,71 the NLRA protected an emplo ee s se of obscene and lgar 
language while he engaged in union activity because the employer had 
tolerated the language in the past and no other employees who witnessed 
the outburst complained about the language used.72 However, in 
Aluminum Co. of America,73 the Board noted that even if profanity in a 
orkplace is common, an emplo ee s profani  can be so egregio s as o 
weigh against protection under the NLRA due to its extreme degree and 
individualized character.74 
If an emplo ee s speech falls i hin either principle, the above tests 
favor protecting that speech under the NLRA. However, workplace 
speech that fits within these principles may create a hostile work 
environment and would thus be unlawful under federal anti-
discrimination laws.75 
II. BAD FAITH BARGAINING 
While the NLRA protects union speech in a variety of workplace 
contexts, a specific intersection of union activity and speech exists during 
                                                     
69. Gre ho nd Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. a  10 (Ma  6, 2019) ( [T]he Board has 
held ha  here he se of profane and lgar lang age as a dail  occ rrence in [ he] Responden s 
orkplace, and [i ] did no  engender an  disciplinar  response,  s ch a fac or eighed in fa or of 
retaining the protection of the Act.  (citing Pier Sixty, LLC 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 505 06 (2015)); see 
Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 983 (2014) (Member Johnson, dissenting). 
70. See Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1269 (2012) (Member Hayes, dissenting), 
vacated, No. 12-1387 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Corr. Corp. of Am., 347 N.L.R.B. 632, 636 (2006) (finding 
that an employee s use of profanity was protected by the Act where profanities were commonly used 
a  he facili  b  [emplo ees] and s per isors alike ).  
71. 260 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1983). 
72. Id. at 1069 70. The Board affirmed he ALJ s decision, finding ha : 
Aldridge s o b rs  as no  so flagran  or egregio s as o remo e him from he pro ec ion of he 
Act. We note . . . that the use of profanity by hospital personnel was not uncommon, including 
i s se in he cafe eria, and had been olera ed in he pas , ha  Aldridge s profane o b rs  as, 
o some degree, pro oked b  emplo ee Jess p s in empera e and profane commen s o Aldridge 
regarding nioni a ion and Aldridge s f re job status, that Jessup herself frequently used 
profanity in conversations with other employees, that the outburst was made during nonworking 
time outside of a patient care area, and that there were apparently few nonemployee visitors in 
the cafeteria at the time in question and no evidence that any complaints, other than by Jessup, 
ere made o managemen  regarding Aldridge s cond c . 
Id. at 1061 62.  
73. 338 N.L.R.B. 20 (2002).  
74. Id. at 21 22.  
75. See infra Part III. 
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bargaining. This Part addresses the duties of employers and unions to 
bargain in good faith and the right to choose representatives, as the NLRA 
only allows parties to walk away from the table if bargaining in good faith 
becomes impossible. It then discusses how certain speech, or conduct, can 
ultimately lead to bad faith bargaining, such that it loses protection under 
the NLRA. However, the NLRB has articulated an incredibly high 
standard for bad faith bargaining, thereby forcing parties to sometimes 
tolerate significant outbursts or harassment. This sets up another potential 
conflict between federal anti-discrimination laws and protected union 
speech. This Part concludes with examples of bad faith bargaining cases 
that distinguish between impermissible and permissible conduct under the 
NLRA. 
A. Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
The duty to bargain in good faith is one of the key concepts of collective 
bargaining. The NLRA76 is one of the most well-known federal acts 
governing collective bargaining, along with other union activity.77 Under 
he NLRA, pri a e emplo ers have a legal duty to bargain in good faith 
i h heir emplo ees  represen a i e and o sign an  collec i e bargaining 
agreemen  ha  has been reached. 78 Section 8(d) of the NLRA sets forth 
the requirements for collective bargaining.79 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA 
makes i  an nfair labor prac ice for an emplo er o ref se o bargain 
collec i el  i h he represen a i es of i s emplo ees  nless cer ain 
criteria are met.80 Under section 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, a union must also 
bargain in good faith on behalf of the employees it represents.81 Pursuant 
to the NLRA, if a union or employer believes that the other party has failed 
                                                     
76. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69. 
77. State statutes govern the collective bargaining duties for state employers and employees. See, 
e.g., WASH REV. CODE. § 41.56 (2019) (describing Washington State s regulations for public 
employees  collective bargaining).  
78. Bargaining in Good Faith with Employees  Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)), 
NAT L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/bargaining-
good-faith-employees-union-representative-section [https://perma.cc/D47X-T396] ( An emplo er 
that violates Section 8(a)(5) also derivatively violates Section 8(a)(1). ). 
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ( [Obliga ion o bargain collec i el ] For he p rposes of his sec ion, o 
bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative 
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement 
reached . . . . ).  
80. Id. § 158(a)(5). 
81. Id. § 158(b)(3). 
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to bargain in good faith, it may file an unfair labor practice complaint.82 
This could lead to remedies ordered by the NLRB.83 
B. Right to Choose Representatives 
Within the collective-bargaining rela ionship, each par  has bo h he 
righ  o selec  he represen a i e for bargaining and nego ia ions  and he 
d  o deal i h he chosen represen a i e of he o her par . 84 Section 7 
of the NLRA gives employees the right to bargain collectively with 
representatives of their choosing.85 And it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees exercising 
that right.86 
However, the righ  o selec  one s bargaining represen a i es is no  
absolute.87 If he presence of one s represen a i e in nego ia ions makes 
collec i e bargaining impossible or f ile,  he o her par  is relie ed of 
its duty to deal with that particular individual thus limi ing one s righ  
to choose their representative.88 These limitations have generally been 
confined o si a ions infec ed i h ill-will, usually personal, or conflict 
of interest as to make good-fai h bargaining imprac ical. 89 
C. Refusal to Bargain 
Given the established duty to bargain under the NLRA, a union or an 
emplo er can onl  ref se o bargain i h an opposing par s 
represen a i e if ha  person s cond c  is so egregio s and be ond he 
pale as o make he bargaining process i self n enable. 90 For a party to 
                                                     
82. Id. § 158. 
83. Id.  
84. Victoria Packing Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (2000); see also Pan Am. Grain Co., 343 
N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing Fitzsimons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375, 379 (1980), aff d sub nom. 
UAW v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
85. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
86. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
87. See Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 296 N.L.R.B. 51, 71 (1989) ( [A]n emplo er can ref se o 
deal with a union representative whose conduct has crossed over a line of permissible conduct 
es ablished b  he Board and he co r s. ).  
88. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600 (quoting Fitzsimons, 251 N.L.R.B. at 379). 
89. Long Island, 296 N.L.R.B. at 71 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 
1969)). 
90. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600; see also Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 
(1986) ( When an individual engages in conduct directed at the employer or its representatives which 
engenders such ill will that it weakens the fabric of the relationship to the extent that good-faith 
bargaining is impossible, ho e er, e recogni e an emplo er s righ  o ref se o mee  and bargain 
with that individual. ). 
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be relie ed of i s d  o bargain, here m s  be pers asi e e idence ha  
the presence of the particular individual would create ill will and make 
good-fai h bargaining impossible. 91 Even behavior that does not occur 
during the bargaining session can still undermine the overall bargaining 
process.92 According to the Board, this high standard for relieving the duty 
o bargain is appropria e beca se he obliga ion o bargain also imposes 
he obliga ion o hicken one s skin and o carr  on e en in the face of 
ha  o her ise o ld be r de and naccep able beha ior. 93 
Additionally, the determination as to whether a representative has acted 
in s ch a a  ha  his or her presence o ld make good-faith bargaining 
impossible  is essen iall  a fac al inq ir . 94 The standard is not based 
on he s bjec i e asser ed reac ions of indi id al bargainers;  he NLRB 
makes an objec i e de ermina ion of he her he cond c  is reasonabl  
likely [to] create ill will . . . . 95 
D. Recent Case Examples of Conduct That Renders Bargaining 
Impossible 
Generally, profanity or vulgar language is insufficient to constitute bad 
faith bargaining.96 Ins ead, he NLRB s applica ion of he bad fai h 
bargaining es  has pheld an emplo er s ref sal o bargain i h a nion 
represen a i e onl  here he represen a i e s cond c  as egregio s, 
such as physical assaults or death threats.97 
                                                     
91. Pan Am. Grain Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 205, 206 (2004) (citing KDEN Broad. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 25, 
35 (1976)). 
92. King Soopers, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 269, 270 (2002) (citing Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. at 
1046 47).  
93. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600. 
94. Pan Am. Grain, 343 N.L.R.B. at 206. 
95. Ready Mix USA, LLC, No. 10-CA-140059, 2015 WL 5440337 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 15, 2015) 
(finding that even if the bargainers subjectively felt like the employee s presence would make 
bargaining impossible, it was a reasonable person s reaction that mattered).  
96. See, e.g., KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 (2005) ( The standards for 
behavior in negotiations are much different than the standards of conduct for an employee in a luxury 
hotel. . . . Thus, to the extent a [party] becomes visibly upset, shaking, or out of control . . . , 
negotiations, in general, have been known to accommodate such behavior. Negotiations may also 
accommodate some profanity. ). 
97. Victoria Packing, 332 N.L.R.B. at 600 (citing Sahara Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. at 1044); see also 
Pan Am. Grain, 343 N.L.R.B. at 206; cf. Neilmed Prods., Inc., No. 20-CA-35363, 2011 WL 2689292 
(N.L.R.B. July 11, 2011). In Neilmed Products, Inc., the ALJ found that the employer violated the 
NLRA by denying a union representative access to the bargaining table because the union 
representative had yelled angry comments at employees crossing a picket line and had broken the 
windshield of a passing car. Id. They determined that the representative s conduct and presence during 
bargaining did not amount to bad faith bargaining. Id. While this Comment notes that the standard for 
what constitutes bad faith bargaining is likely outdated and needs adjusting, it is beyond scope of this 
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1. Sit ations Where an Emplo er s Ref sal to Bargain Was Upheld 
In Fitzsimmons Manufacturing Co.,98 he NLRB pheld an emplo er s 
refusal to bargain after a physical altercation between a Union 
representative and the emplo er s personnel direc or.99 The representative 
believed that the personnel director had disclosed confidential material to 
he Union s bargaining commi ee.100 The representative grabbed the 
direc or b  his ie, said he o ld p nch him in he face and knock him 
on his ass,  and s gges ed ha  he  go o side and figh .101 This 
altercation occurred during a grievance meeting, without provocation, and 
in the presence of other employees.102 The employer then requested that 
the Union remove him as the representative for its facility.103 The Union 
repeatedly assured the employer that an outburst like that would not 
happen again and the representative would control his behavior.104 
However, the employer refused to bargain with the Union unless the 
representative was removed.105 
The Board concl ded ha  he emplo er s ref sal o bargain i h he 
Union as la f l beca se he represen a i e s cond c  as s fficien l  
egregious as to render good faith bargaining impossible.106 The Board 
rested its conclusion on the fact that the representative assaulted the 
director and his conduct was unprovoked.107 Since the assault occurred 
after the parties had stopped discussing any topics of dispute, there was 
no j s ifica ion for he represen a i e s ini ial se of ph sical force or his 
attempt to continue the confrontation.108 Moreo er, he represen a i e s 
behavior was disruptive to bargaining because his outburst took place in 
the presence of the employee bargaining committee whose members 
looked to the representative for leadership and the emplo er s 
management officials.109 The Board did not alter its conclusion, despite 
                                                     
Comment. 
98. 251 N.L.R.B. 375 (1980), aff d sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1982). 
99. Id. at 376, 379. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 376. 
102. Id. at 376, 379. 
103. Id. at 376 77. 
104. Id. at 377. 
105. Id.  
106. Id. at 379. 
107. Id.  
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
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he Union s ass rances ha  he represen a i e had no  pre io sl  
assa l ed he emplo er s officials and o ld no  ac  o  again, and he 
fact that the director later departed from he emplo er s managemen  
team.110 While a pa ern of assa l s ma  j s if  a par s ref sal o mee  
with a particular representative, the Board noted in this case that it can 
also find the refusal to bargain justified on other grounds.111 
King Soopers, Inc.112 featured an altercation between a supervisor and 
a long-time employee.113 The employee, who had previously been a union 
s e ard, confron ed his s per isor abo  he emplo er s decision o 
schedule him for a Saturday shift.114 During the confrontation, the 
emplo ee angrily threw his meathook over his shoulder, narrowly 
missing [ano her] emplo ee. 115 The emplo ee also hre  a 40-pound 
piece of meat into a saw (breaking its blade); threw his knife into a box; 
threatened his supervisor; and refused to follow he s ore manager s order 
o lea e he s ore. 116 Before his inciden , he emplo ee had placed his 
hand o er he s ore manager s mo h d ring a disc ssion i h her. 117 The 
employer terminated the employee, citing his threatening and violent 
behavior.118 Four years later, the Union hired the former employee as a 
business agent and assigned him to duties at his former store.119 Once the 
employer learned that the agent would be entering the workplace as a 
business agent, it told the Union it would not deal with him regarding 
union matters because of his violent past.120 
The Board held that the employer did not violate the NLRA by refusing 
o deal i h he Union s b siness agen , since he agen  had pre io sl  
engaged in violent and disruptive behavior during minor disputes, such as 
                                                     
110. Id. at 379 80 ( [W]e find ha  nei her he informal se lemen  agreemen  nor he Union s 
ass rances are s fficien  o dissipa e he effec  of Mas os  cond c . . . . Mas os  cond c  as no  
prompted by personal animosity towards Vogel. Rather, Mastos responded as he did because he 
believed that Vogel would refer to matters previously resolved through collective bargaining. In these 
circumstances, Respondent could reasonably fear that similar attacks might occur if other of 
Responden s officials men ioned he Oc ober 1977 meeting or any other subject of collective 
bargaining as to which Mastos might be or become sensitive. ).  
111. Id. at 380. 
112. 338 N.L.R.B. 269 (2002). 
113. Id. at 269. 
114. Id. 
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. Id.  
118. Id. 
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
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scheduling issues.121 This egregio s miscond c  mean  ha  indi id als 
required to deal with him in an adversarial setting, like a grievance 
mee ing, migh  reasonabl  be preocc pied i h he legi ima e concern 
ha  he o ld reac  iolen l  if his posi ion did no  pre ail. 122 That 
preoccupation might undermine good faith collective bargaining by 
impeding a igoro s e change of posi ions nenc mbered b  he hrea  
of an ad ersar s iolen  reac ion. 123 Th s, he agen s propensi  o reac  
violently during disputes would make good faith bargaining impossible.124 
Finally, the Board found that the absence of physical injury or intent to 
ca se ph sical inj r  as irrele an  o i s concl sion ha  he agen s 
presence would cause ill-will.125 
2. Sit ations Where an Emplo er s Ref sal to Bargain Was Held 
Unlawful 
In Victoria Packing Corp.,126 a Union representative became 
confron a ional and aggressi e i h a compan s o ner.127 The 
represen a i e elled, I m going o ge  o  and o r f[**]king compan  
while aggressively shaking his finger at the compan s o ner, ho old 
him that he could not talk to employees during work hours.128 The Board 
concl ded ha  he emplo er s ref sal o allo  he Union represen a i e 
to be present at its workplace violated its duty to bargain.129 It found that 
the Union represen a i e s cond c  co ld no  reasonabl  be cons r ed as 
ain ing he bargaining process as long as he as personall  in ol ed. 130 
While he represen a i e s cond c  ma  ha e been r de and e en 
e cessi e in a social or b siness con e ,  i  as of a shor  d ra ion, did 
                                                     
121. Id. at 269 70 (noting that the employee s violent outburst prior to termination clearly 
jeopardized the safety of a supervisor and a fellow employee ).  
122. Id. at 269. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. at 269 70 ( The fact that Gonzales has had nonviolent encounters as a shop steward in the 
past as well as some nonviolent encounters with employers in his capacity as a business agent is of 
limited significance in resolving the issue at hand, namely, whether his tendency to react violently 
during a confrontation j s ifies he Responden s ref sal o deal i h him. ).  
125. Id. a  270 ( Gon ales  beha ior as plainl  reckless, and al ho gh he migh  ha e ac ed 
without a subjective intent to cause physical injury when he narrowly missed striking an employee 
with a meathook, this does not mitigate or change how it would reasonably be perceived by 
bystanders, and thus does not ameliorate the potentially debilitating effect on bargaining. ). 
126. 332 N.L.R.B. 597 (2000). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 599. 
129. Id. at 597 98. 
130. Id. at 600. 
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not involve any kind of physical contact or explicit threat of force, 
and . . . was a one time event in an otherwise business like and productive 
rela ionship be een he Union and he Emplo er. 131 
In Long Island Jewish Medical Center,132 a Union business agent 
engaged in repea ed confron a ions i h he emplo er s hospi al s aff. In 
one incident, he pushed a hospital adminis ra or, called her an asshole  
multiple times, and briefly blocked her from accessing her desk.133 During 
a second incident, the agent directed obscenities at hospital staff.134 The 
final incident involved the agent handing out leaflets to hospital staff 
about the upcoming union meetings.135 As the agent was handing out 
leaflets, a hospital administrator took the leaflets, handed them back to the 
agent, and then pushed him.136 The agent then did the same to the 
administrator.137 The employer subsequently banned the business agent 
from the hospital.138 The Board fo nd ha  he b siness agen s ac s d ring 
the final incident, which formed the crux of the allegation, were provoked 
by the hospital administrator.139 F r her, hile he b siness agen s 
actions were not condoned, they were not sufficiently egregious to justify 
the employer refusing to bargain with the business agent.140 In light of all 
hree inciden s, he NLRB concl ded ha  he b siness agen s presence a  
bargaining would not cause ill-will or make future bargaining 
impossible.141 
These decisions illustrate that, in some circumstances, behavior such 
as shoving supervisors, shouting profanities on numerous occasions, and 
becoming confrontational does not amount to bad faith bargaining. When 
the NLRB does find the bad faith bargaining standard to be met, it is often 
                                                     
131. Id.  
132. 296 N.L.R.B. 51 (1989). 
133. Id. at 71. 
134. Id. at 57 ( Nordenberg immedia el  began elling: To gh shi , I don  need o r permission, 
I m going o do ha  I an  o do . . . screw you o  don  kno  he con rac .  She said: I do kno  
he con rac ; no  is no  he ime o be here.  Carnel hen called sec ri , and told them that she needed 
a security officer . . . . She then walked out of her office and saw that Nordenberg was walking toward 
the front of the office. . . . When he reached he fron , Nordenberg as in he corridor elling: Yo  
don  kno  he contract scre  o , o re an asshole. ). 
135. Id. at 57 59. 
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 60.  
139. Id. at 72. 
140. Id. ( An emplo er canno  rel  on an emplo ee s indiscre ion o j s if  a discharge hen i  
was provoked by an agent of the employer. ).  
141. Id.  
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due to the presence of a physical altercation or threats of physical 
iolence. Accordingl , he NLRB s decisions ha e es ablished a high 
standard as to what rises to the level of bad faith bargaining, and in doing 
so, sometimes protect otherwise harassing conduct. 
III. HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
NLRA 
The NLRB decisions abo e foc s on he scope of an emplo er s d  
to bargain in good faith with union representatives, but employers must 
also comply with a host of other employment laws. Federal anti-
discrimination laws may be invoked alongside the NLRA in situations 
involving the types of harassing conduct described above.142 This Part 
addresses what constitutes actionable workplace harassment under federal 
anti-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.143 This Part then discusses employer liability for workplace 
harassment and its duty to establish a safe, harassment-free work 
environment. It gives examples that illustrate the interplay between 
workplace conduct that violates federal anti-discrimination law, but, 
under current precedent, may remain protected under the NLRA. Finally, 
this Part concludes by suggesting that the norms of appropriate workplace 
beha ior ha e e ol ed o er he ears, and ha  he NLRB s s andards ha e 
largely overlooked these changes. 
A. Actionable Harassment in the Workplace Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Laws 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge, refuse to hire, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
s ch indi id al s race, color, religion, se , or na ional origin. 144 The 
                                                     
142. See infra section III.C. Federal anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA both address the lawful 
or unlawful workplace speech or conduct. However, the two are distinct in that the NLRA applies 
specifically to union speech while federal anti-discrimination laws apply to all workplace speech. 
While State laws may also impose anti-discrimination obligations for an employer, this Comment 
focuses solely on federal law. 
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
144. Id. Title VII s prohibition on discrimination extends to a prohibition on harassment based on 
the same protected traits. See, e.g., Diaz v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 318 F.3d 796, 799 801 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that harassment based on national origin was actionable where Hispanic employees were 
mocked about their accent and told Hispanics sho ld be cleaning  and Hispanics are s pid ); 
Forres  . Brinker In l Pa roll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that case law 
 
Gibbons (Do Not Delete) 10/15/2020  10:54 AM 
2020] LICENSE TO OFFEND 1513 
 
la s prohibi ion on discrimina ion i h respec  o erms, condi ions, or 
pri ileges of emplo men  co ers harassmen  in ol ing a pro ec ed 
charac eris ic ha  crea e[s] a hos ile or ab si e ork en ironmen . 145 
Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who 
oppose nla f l emplo men  prac ice[s]. 146 The Americans with 
Disabilities Act147 (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act148 (ADEA) prohibit workplace discrimination and harassment based 
on a disability149 and age,150 respectively. An employer could violate 
federal anti-discrimina ion la  hen he orkplace is permea ed i h 
discrimina or  in imida ion, ridic le, and ins l ,  ha  is s fficien l  
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic im s emplo men  and 
crea e an ab si e orking en ironmen . 151 But not all workplace 
harassment is actionable under federal law.152 
To be actionable under federal anti-discrimination law, workplace 
harassmen  m s  be objec i el  hos ile or ab si e  and he victim must 
s bjec i el  percei e he en ironmen  o be [hos ile or] ab si e. 153 
                                                     
es ablishes ha  he se of se all  degrading, gender-specific epithets, such as . . . b[***]h,  . . . has 
been consis en l  held o cons i e harassmen  based pon se ). 
145. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson 
World ide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11 h Cir. 2010) ( Ti le VII does no  prohibi  profani  alone, 
however profane. It does not prohibit harassment alone, however severe and pervasive. Instead, 
Title VII prohibits discrimination, including harassment that discriminates based on a protected 
category such as sex.  (quoting Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1301 02 
(11th Cir. 2007))).  
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
148. 29 U.S.C. § 623. 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see, e.g., Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 3, 7 8 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(affirming jury verdict under ADA for harassment based on the employee s disability where the 
evidence demonstrated that the employee s supervisors mocked him, made comments to other 
employees, and drove a truck at him while he crossed a street). 
150. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see, e.g., Davis-Garett v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30, 42 (2d Cir. 
2019) (reversing the district court s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the plaintiff s age 
harassment claim because a triable issue of material fact existed as to plaintiff s claim of a hostile 
work environment based on daily age-disparaging cri icisms  direc ed a  he plain iff).  
151. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 67 (1986)). 
152. See id. 
153. Id. at 21 22 ( So long as he en ironment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, 
as hos ile or ab si e, here is no need for i  also o be ps chologicall  inj rio s.  (ci a ions omi ed)); 
see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2001); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 
47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9 h Cir. 1995) ( Whe her he orkplace is objec i el  hos ile m s  be de ermined 
from he perspec i e of a reasonable person i h he same f ndamen al charac eris ics. ). Workplace 
harassment based on protected characteristics is only actionable under Title VII if i  is s fficien l  
se ere or per asi e o al er he condi ions of [ he ic im s] emplo men  and crea e an ab si e orking 
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Courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
determine whether the harassment was sufficiently hostile or abusive by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances.154 These can incl de he 
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
he her i  nreasonabl  in erferes i h an emplo ee s ork 
performance. 155 However, no single factor is required for a claim of 
workplace harassment to succeed.156 
With specific regard to workplace sexual harassment claims, the 
totality of the circumstances analysis generally includes consideration of 
he harasser s s a s, ho i nessed he harassment, where the harassment 
occurred, how often the harassment occurred, what the outburst involved, 
and the social context in which the outburst occurred.157 Courts may 
consider whether the harasser was a supervisor, coworker, or non-
employee.158 Harassmen  from a s per isor is inheren l  more se ere 
han ha  of a co orker beca se of he s per isor s a hori  o er he 
employee. 159 A co orker s harassmen , ho e er, can also lead o a 
hostile work environment.160 Harassment is generally most severe when 
                                                     
en ironmen .  Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
154. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (b) (2019). The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex require the Commission to 
assess the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an individual s claim of sexual 
harassment in the workplace is actionable. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (b).  
155. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 
156. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
157. Id. ( These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
in erferes i h an emplo ee s ork performance. ); Martinez v. Marin Sanitary Serv., 349 F. Supp. 
2d 1234, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ( When he harassmen  comes from a s per isor, ra her han a 
co orker, he cond c  ma  be considered more se ere. ); Brooks . Ci  of San Ma eo, 229 F.3d 917, 
927 (9th Cir. 2000) ( [A] se al assa l  b  a s per isor, e en on a single occasion, ma  ell be 
sufficiently severe so as to alter the conditions of employment and give rise to a hostile work 
en ironmen  claim. ).  
158. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 8, 1995) (noting that Title VII protects employees from harassment instigated by non-
employees). 
159. Brief of EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 
14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter EEOC]; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) ( [A] s per isor s po er and a hori  in es s his or her harassing conduct 
with a particular threatening character . . . . ); Bo er-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 
278 (4 h Cir. 2015) (en banc) ( In meas ring he se eri  of harassing cond c , he s a s of he 
harasser may be a significant factor . . . . ). 
160. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 55 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding that a reasonable 
trier of fact could determine that a hostile work environment existed based on evidence that the 
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directed at a specific individual, although indirect harassment can create 
a hostile work environment as well.161 Courts have also concluded that 
harassment might be more severe when it occurs in the presence of 
others.162 
The frequency and gravity of the conduct is also important for a court 
o consider in de ermining if harassmen  mee s he se ere or per asi e  
requirement.163 Even isolated incidents of severe harassment can be 
actionable, especially if the harassment is sexual or race-based.164 
Furthermore, harassment can meet the sufficiently severe requirement 
even if it is not physically threatening.165 Finally, the social context in 
hich beha ior occ rs and is e perienced b  i s arge  is also impor an  
in determining whether the harassment created a hostile work 
environment.166 The objec i e hos ili  of he harassmen  req ires an 
                                                     
plain iff s co orker s bjec ed her o h milia ing se al remarks and inn endos ); see also infra 
section III.B. 
161. See, e.g., Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 647 n.2 (7 h Cir. 2011) ( [S]econdhand 
harassmen  is less se ere han firs hand harassmen . ); see also Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 
Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 811 (11 h Cir. 2010) ( I  is eno gh o hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to 
female colleag es as b[***]hes,  h[*]res  and c[*]n s,  o nders and ha  he  ie  omen 
negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The harasser need not close the circle with 
reference o he plain iff specificall : and o  are a b[***]h,  oo. ); Adams v. Austal, USA, LLC, 
754 F.3d 1240, 1253 (11 h Cir. 2014) (no ing ha  hile a noose in breakroom is a se ere form of 
racial harassmen ,  he plain iff s e perience as less se ere beca se he did no  see i  firs hand ). 
162. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).  
163. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) ( The req ired le el of se eri  or serio sness aries 
in ersel  i h he per asi eness or freq enc  of he cond c .  [S]imple easing, offhand commen s, 
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 
erms and condi ions of emplo men .  (ci a ions omi ed)).  
164.  Ellison . Brad , 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9 h Cir. 1991) ( [T]he req ired sho ing of se eri y or 
seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the 
cond c . ); Gerald . Uni . of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1s  Cir. 2013) (concl ding ha  plain iff 
successfully established a hostile work environment claim where her male supervisor grabbed her 
breast and made sexually suggestive noises); Rosemond v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 456 F. 
S pp. 2d 204, 213 (D. Mass. 2006) (concl ding ha  a reasonable j r  co ld de ermine ha  he noose 
incident, standing alone, was objectively hos ile or ab si e  and crea ed a hos ile ork en ironmen  
(emphasis in original)); Ayissi Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that 
a single inciden  migh  ell ha e been s fficien  o es ablish a hos ile ork en ironmen  in a case 
in ol ing a s per isor ho sed a deepl  offensi e racial epi he  [ n****r ] hen elling a  [ he 
emplo ee] o ge  o  of he office ). 
165. EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 318 (4 h Cir. 2008) ( Names can h r  as m ch 
as sticks and stones, and the Supreme Court has never indicated that the humiliation so frequently 
a ached o hos ile en ironmen s need be accompanied b  ph sical hrea  or force. ). 
166. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 82 (1998) ( A professional 
foo ball pla er s orking en ironmen  is no  se erel  or per asi el  ab si e, for e ample, if he 
coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field even if the same behavior would 
reasonabl  be e perienced as ab si e b  he coach s secre ar  (male or female) back a  he office. ). 
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appropria e sensi i i  o social con e . 167 This sensitivity to social 
con e  helps co r s o dis ing ish be een simple easing or 
roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a 
reasonable person in he plain iff s posi ion o ld find se erel  hos ile or 
abusive. 168 
Although context matters under the Title VII totality of circumstances 
analysis, courts have refused to grant leeway to employees who make 
racist or sexist comments despite an alleged workplace norm.169 Contrary 
to NLRB precedent regarding the scope of acceptable conduct in a 
workplace bargaining context, courts interpreting Title VII have 
consistently held that there is no crude work environment or industrial life 
workplace justification for offensive language.170 Further, there is no 
exception under Title VII for offensive comments made by an employee 
who has impassioned feelings about workplace matters.171 Under Title 
VII, severe or pervasive harassment based on a protected characteristic is 
unlawful if it is both objectively and subjectively hostile there is no 
statutory safeguard for discriminatory behavior based on norms of the 
workplace.172 
B. Employer Liability for Workplace Harassment 
Courts and agencies have held that an employer can be liable for 
workplace harassment, but the degree of liability depends on the 
perpetra or s iden i  as ei her a s per isor, co orker, or non-
employee.173 Employers are vicariously liable174 for a hostile work 
                                                     
167. Id. at 82 (The real social impac  of orkplace beha ior of en depends on a cons ella ion of 
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple 
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. ). 
168. Id. 
169. See Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 318. 
170. See id. ( Ti le VII con ains no [] cr de en ironmen  e cep ion, and o read one in o i  migh  
i ia e s a or  safeg ards for hose ho need hem mos . ); Q iles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that an employer could not argue that daily harassment about the 
emplo ee s disabili  as no  ac ionable beca se ha  pe of cond c  is common in bl e-collar 
orkplaces ); Smi h . Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7 h Cir. 1999); cf. Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 
N.L.R.B. 972, 978 79 (2014). 
171. Susan Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. & 
POL Y REV. 2, 22 29, 37 47 (2016). 
172. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 22 (1993). 
173. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 29 (2013).  
174. As union representatives are often not supervisors, the standard applicable to liability for 
s per isor harassmen  is no  rele an  o his Commen s foc s on he in ersec ion be een Ti le VII 
and NLRA standards for evaluating inappropriate conduct by a union representative. This Comment 
will focus on the standard applicable to coworker or non-employee harassment. 
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en ironmen  crea ed b  a s per isor s harassmen  hen he s per isor 
takes a tangible employment action.175 Such actions can include a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits. 176 
When a non-supervisory coworker creates the hostile work 
en ironmen , co r s anal e an emplo er s liabili  nder a negligence 
standard.177 The standard looks at whether the employer acted reasonably 
to prevent or correct harassment it knew about, or should reasonably have 
known about.178 In other words, employers must take corrective action 
reasonabl  calc la ed o end he harassmen  as soon as he  ha e no ice 
of the conduct, even if the harassment has not yet created a hostile work 
environment.179 Co r s m s  consider he her he emplo er s response 
to each incident of harassment is proportional to the incident and 
reasonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent future harassing 
behavior. 180 The type of action that will be appropriate to end the 
harassment will vary case-by-case. In some situations, a warning or 
suspension may be appropriate, whereas others may require discharge or 
transfer.181 While it is not a complete defense, employers can demonstrate 
that they are preventing workplace harassment by implementing effective 
                                                     
175. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
176. Id. ( [S] ch as hiring, firing, failing o promo e, reassignmen  i h significan l  differen  
responsibili ies, or a decision ca sing a significan  change in benefi s. ). In defining a s per isor, he 
Supreme Court has held that a supervisor is someone ho an emplo er has empo ered o ake 
angible emplo men  ac ions agains  he ic im.  Vance, 570 U.S. at 431. Additionally, when the 
s per isor s harassmen  does no  res l  in a angible emplo men  ac ion, an emplo er ma  escape 
liability by es ablish as an affirma i e defense, ha  (1) he emplo er e ercised reasonable care o 
prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.  Id. at 424 (first 
citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); and then citing Burlington Indus., 
524 U.S. at 765). 
177. Vance, 570 U.S. at 424, 427 ( If the harassing emplo ee is he ic im s co-worker, the 
employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. ); see also Doe v. 
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 
178. See EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669 70 (4th Cir. 2011); Erickson v. Wis. Dep t of 
Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605 06 (7th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Waste Mgmt., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 30 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 41 (8th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE 
Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 21 (9th Cir. 2004). 
179. EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Amirmokri v. 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131 32 (4th Cir. 1995)); see Erickson, 469 F.3d at 605
06; Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 28 (D. Nev. 1992); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(f) (2019). 
180. Scarberry v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259 60 (10th Cir. 2003). 
181. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 343 44 (6th Cir. 2008); Bailey v. 
Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 467 68 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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anti-discrimination policies.182 
Employer liability can also extend beyond the workplace, and beyond 
interactions between solely employees. Employers can be liable for non-
employee harassment that occurs inside or outside of the workplace.183 
For example, employers may be responsible for a non-emplo ee s se al 
harassmen  of emplo ees in he orkplace hen he emplo er knows or 
should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and 
appropriate corrective action. 184 Employers can also be liable for 
harassment that occurs outside the workplace when that conduct affects 
an emplo ee s percei ed rea men  inside he orkplace, h s crea ing a 
hostile work environment.185 When an employee is harassed outside the 
workplace, such as on social media, a trip for work, or a picket line, 
employers who do nothing to prevent or correct harassment may be liable 
if he cond c  affec s he emplo ee s ork life.186 
C. The Board s Precedent for E al ating Raciall  or Se all  
Offensive Language or Conduct Likely Conflicts with Federal Anti-
Discrimination Laws 
In certain circumstances, NLRB precedent protects employees who 
engage in profane, racist, or sexist outbursts.187 The conflict between this 
precedent and federal anti-discrimination laws may protect intolerable 
behavior in the workplace and subject employers to potential liability 
under laws like Title VII, especially because employers can be held liable 
                                                     
182. Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that an employer s 
written harassment policy was relevant to the negligence analysis in determining employer liability 
for harassment); see also Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1027 28. 
183. Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1024; Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th 
Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C94-790C, 1995 WL 569446, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 
8, 1995) ( Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory 
in imida ion, ridic le, and ins l .  The alleged harassmen  here as ins iga ed b  a FedE  customer 
and directed at a FedEx employee during the course and scope of her employment. FedEx cannot 
escape the dictates of Title VII on the fortuitous ground that its employees are couriers whose duties 
take them onto the premises of FedEx customers.  (citations omitted)). 
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2019). 
185. See Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 63 n.4 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding that Facebook 
messages could be considered when determining if an employee s harassment created a hostile work 
environment, particularly where they were about workplace conduct and were sent by someone who 
worked with the plaintiff).  
186. Fed. Express, 1995 WL 569446, at *2 4; Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 
966 69 (9th Cir. 2002).  
187. See Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014); Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505 
(2015); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
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for harassment created by employees or nonemployees.188 To comply with 
the NLRA, an employer may be forced to continue bargaining with union 
members who are creating a hostile workplace and may not be allowed to 
discipline employees for engaging in conduct that violates federal law. 
This makes it difficult for an employer to abide by its obligations under 
both federal anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA, and it could leave 
the employer vulnerable to a discrimination claim under Title VII. The 
court in Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, National Ass n v. 
NLRB189 addressed this discrepancy when it noted the issues that 
employers face when the Board finds unlawful behavior to be protected 
under the NLRA: employers are subject to civil liability if they fail to 
maintain a workplace free of harassment, but some abusive language 
protected under he NLRA can constitute verbal harassment triggering 
liabili  nder s a e or federal la . 190 Th s, o bar or limi  an emplo er s 
abili  o ins la e i self from s ch liabili  is o place i  in a ca ch 22. 191 
1. NLRB Precedent Protecting Racially or Sexually Offensive 
Language/Conduct 
In Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC,192 the Board found 
the employer had violated the NLRA by terminating employee Andrew 
Williams af er he ro e a se all  offensi e s a emen  on he emplo er s 
overtime signup sheets.193 This event occurred after the Union and the 
employer reached an impasse during bargaining, leading to the 
emplo er s nila eral implemen a ion of a ne  o er ime sched ling 
system.194 Under the new policy, employees interested in working 
overtime could sign up on a sheet posted on a bulletin board outside the 
lunchroom.195 The employees who opposed the new system began calling 
he o er ime sign p shee s a h[*]re board,  clearl  impl ing ha  hose 
who signed it were compromising their loyalty to the Union and their 
co orkers in order o benefi  hemsel es and accommoda e  he 
                                                     
188. Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1024; Folkerson, 107 F.3d at 756; Fed. Express, 1995 WL 569446, at 
*3.  
189. 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
190. Id. at 27. 
191. Id. 
192. 366 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (July 24, 2018). 
193. Id., slip op. at 1. 
194. Id. 
195. Id.  
 
Gibbons (Do Not Delete) 10/15/2020  10:54 AM 
1520 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1493 
 
employer.196 The erm h[*]re board  became a common e pression, 
freq en l  ered e en b  s per isors. 197 The Board found no evidence 
that the employer censored or punished employees for using the 
expression.198 During the ongoing dispute regarding the overtime policy, 
Williams ro e h[*]re board  a  he op of he o er ime sign p 
sheets.199 The employer suspended, and ultimately terminated, Williams 
for illf ll  and deliberately engaging in insulting and harassing 
conduct. 200 
The Board held, contrary to the ALJ, that the employer violated the Act 
when it terminated Williams.201 It concluded that Williams was engaged 
in pro ec ed ac i i  hen he ro e wh[*]re board  on he o er ime 
sign p shee s beca se his ac  as a con in a ion and o gro h of he 
emplo ees  bo co  and opposi ion o he Responden s implemen a ion 
of an o er ime polic .  202 Applying the Atlantic Steel test, the Board 
concluded that Williams s pro ec ed ac i i  as no  so egregio s as o 
lose he NLRA s pro ec ion.203 
The NLRB found the location factor neutral or slightly in favor of 
losing he Ac s pro ec ion.204 The signup sheets were in a highly-
trafficked work area right outside of the lunchroom.205 Th s, Williams s 
se is  e pression as cer ain o be seen b  emplo ees. 206 However, 
beca se he eekl  sign p shee s ere emporar  in na re and co ld 
ha e been easil  remo ed or replaced,  he Board concl ded ha  
Williams s conduct did not disrupt work or interfere with the use of the 
signup sheets.207 
As to the subject matter of the dispute, the NLRB found it strongly 
fa ored re aining he Ac s pro ec ion.208 Other employees previously had 
pro es ed he emplo er s ne  o er ime polic  and had sed the same 
                                                     
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. ( Indeed, there appears to have been a general laxity toward profane and vulgar language 
in the workplace. ). 
199. Id., slip op. at 2. 
200. Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546, 549 51 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
201. Constellium, slip op. at 4. 
202. Id., slip op. at 2. 
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expression as Williams h[*]re board. 209 Thus, the Board concluded 
ha  Williams s cond c  and se of he erm as direc l  rela ed o he 
ongoing employee opposition of the new policy.210 
The NLRB fo nd ha  he na re of Williams s cond c  fa ored 
protection of the Act.211 It noted that his outburst was spontaneous and 
direc ed a  his co orkers and his emplo er, no  j s  an ac  of mere 
andalism. 212 While he Board ackno ledged ha  Williams s ord 
choice as harsh and arg abl  lgar,  i  no ed that the expression 
reflec ed his and his co orkers  s rong feelings abo  he ongoing 
disp e  rela ed o he ne  polic .213 Referring to the norms of the 
orkplace, he Board no ed ha  he emplo er s fail re o discipline 
emplo ees  for heir se of he e pression h[*]re board and general 
tolerance of profanity in the workplace weakened any argument that 
Williams s e pression as egregio s.214 
Finally, the NLRB concluded that the provocation factor was neutral.215 
The emplo er s nila eral implemen a ion of the new overtime policy 
precipitated a labor dispute and employee protest.216 The Board noted that 
Williams s ac  as a response o he emplo ees  bo co  and his belief 
that the implementation of the new policy violated the terms of the expired 
collective-bargaining agreement.217 However, it also found that 
Williams s ac  as no  an immedia e reac ion o an nfair labor prac ice 
or any type of uncivil conduct by the employer.218 
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,219 an employee on a picket line shouted 
obscenities at predominantly African-American replacement workers, 
incl ding He , did o  bring eno gh KFC for e er one?  and He  
an bod  smell ha ? I smell fried chicken and a ermelon. 220 Fellow 
picke ers allegedl  la ghed a  he emplo ee s offensi e comments, 







215. Id., slip. op. at 4. 
216. Id., slip. op. at 3. 
217. Id. 
218. Id., slip. op. at 4 (noting that it was not a reaction to an unfair labor practice because the Board 
had not yet deemed the implementation of the new policy unfair).  
219. 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (May 17, 2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017). 
220. Id., slip. op. at 4.  
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mocking the replacement workers in the process.221 The employer fired 
the employee based on his comments made during the strike because the 
commen s iola ed he compan s an i-harassmen  polic  and he nion s 
conduct rules.222 
The Board, affirming the ALJ s r ling, req ired he emplo ee s 
reins a emen , concl ding ha  he NLRA pro ec ed he emplo ee s se of 
racial slurs on the picket line.223 The ALJ concl ded ha  he emplo ee s 
conduct was racist and offensive, but under the Clear Pine Mouldings, 
Inc.224 s andard, did no  end o coerce or in imida e emplo ees,  nor did 
i  raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminen  ph sical 
confrontation. 225 Addi ionall , he emplo ee s s a emen s ere 
unaccompanied by any threatening behavior or physical acts of 
in imida ion. 226 These findings were consistent with clearly established 
Board preceden  holding ha  a s riker s or picke er s se of e en he 
most vile language and/or gestures, standing alone, does not forfeit the 
protection of the Act, so long as those actions do not constitute a threat. 227 
2. Racially or Sexually Offensive Language/Conduct Similar to That 
Protected by NLRB Precedent is Found by Courts to Violate Title 
VII 
To avoid liability for harassment, employers have an obligation to take 
prompt, effective action to stop and prevent harassing conduct in violation 
of Title VII. Consequently, an employer that refrains from remedial action 
because it is trying to meet NLRA obligations may find itself facing 
liability under Title VII. This section compares similar conduct that 
violates Title VII but is protected under the NLRA. 
In Howley v. Town of Stratford,228 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                     
221. Id. 
222. Id., slip. op. at 5. 
223. Id., slip. op. at 1, 5, 12. 
224. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); see supra 
section I.B. 
225. Cooper Tire, slip. op. at 5 8, 10. ( [In Clear Pine Mouldings, the Board adopted a test] for 
de ermining he her erbal hrea s b  s rikers direc ed a  fello  emplo ees j s if  an emplo er s 
refusal to reinstate. According to that test, an employer can lawfully deny reinstatement to a striker if 
his misconduct is such that under the circumstances, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate 
employees in the rights protected under the Act . . . . Since the Clear Pine Mouldings standard is an 
objective one, it does not involve an inquiry into whether any particular employee was coerced or 
intimidated.  (citations omitted)).  
226. Id., slip. op. at 8. 
227. Id.  
228. 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and 
dismissing he plain iff s hos ile-work-environment claim.229 The case 
involved a female firefighter who brought a Title VII action against the 
town and her coworker, alleging both sexual harassment and failure to 
promote.230 The court noted that considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the co orker s cond c  could reasonably be viewed as 
ha ing in olerabl  al ered [ he plain iff s] ork en ironmen . 231 The 
co r  b ffered i s concl sion b  finding ha  he co orker did no  simpl  
make a few offensive comments; nor did he air his views in private; nor 
were his comments merely obscene without an apparent connection to [the 
plain iff s] abili  o perform her job. 232 The coworker made obscene 
comments on one occasion, but did so at length, loudly, and in front of a 
large group of the female plaintiff s male s bordina es.233 His comments 
included allegations that the plaintiff had only gained her position by 
performing sexual acts.234 Beca se a firefigh er s s ccess of en depends 
on he unquestioning execution of line-of-command orders in emergency 
situa ions,  gender-based skepticism as to the competence of a 
commanding officer ma  easil  diminish[] he respec  accorded he 
officer by subordinates and thereby impair[] her ability to lead in the life-
threatening circumstances often faced by firefighters. 235 The court 
concl ded, as a ma er of la , ha  a ra ional j ror co ld ie  s ch a 
irade as h milia ing and res l ing in an in olerable al era ion of Ho le s 
orking condi ions. 236 
Likewise, in EEOC v. Central Wholesalers, Inc.,237 the Fourth Circuit 
Co r  of Appeals re ersed he dis ric  co r s gran  of s mmar  j dgmen  
to the defendant, Central Wholesalers.238 The plain iff s co orkers sed 
the word b***h on a daily basis when referring to women,  had Pla bo  
items in the office, watched porn next to the plaintiff, and had 
screensavers depicting partially naked women.239 One coworker called the 
                                                     
229. Id. at 145. 
230. Id.  
231. Id. at 154. 
232. Id.  
233. Id.  
234. Id.  
235. Id.  
236. Id.  
237. 573 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2009). 
238. Id. at 179.  
239. Id. at 175. 
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plain iff a b***h  a n mber of imes d ring one o b rs  a  ork.240 The 
court also noted that multiple of he plain iff s co orkers sed he ord 
n****r in her presence on a reg lar basis,  and one co orker called he 
plain iff a [B]lack s pid n****r and o her raciall  deroga or  erms  
during a single outburst at work.241 The court concluded that a reasonable 
jury could find that the plaintiff perceived the harassment based on her 
race and gender to be sufficiently abusive or hostile, as she had 
complained that she found the harassment objectionable and it caused her 
emotional distress.242 Additionally, the court held that a reasonable jury 
could find that the gender-based and race-based harassment was 
objectively severe or pervasive.243 Its conclusion was supported by 
e idence ha  he plain iff s co orkers sed offensi e and deroga or  
ords like b***h  and n****r  in he orkplace on a reg lar basis.244 
These cases illustrate how the NLRA potentially protects individuals 
when they engage in one type of behavior, while Title VII may not. 
Another key difference is that under Title VII, courts generally consider 
bo h he emplo er s obliga ions nder federal an i-discrimination laws 
and he alleged harasser s cond c . B  in NLRA cases, he Board rarel , 
if e er, considers he emplo er s obliga ions o main ain a harassmen -
free workplace under anti-discrimination laws. 
D. The NLRB s O tdated Vie s of Protected Union Speech O erlook 
the Changes in Our Culture 
The boundaries of tolerated workplace behavior have evolved 
drastically over the past few decades due to growing social pressure to 
establish workplaces that value civility, respect, and inclusion. Employers 
and workers alike have expressed a commitment to these values. NLRB 
standards, however, have allowed profanity, vulgarity, obscenity, and 
harassment in the workplace under the guise of being part of industrial life 
or norms of the workplace. These standards are outdated and 
unproductive. Since the enactment of the NLRA eighty-five years ago, the 
type of behavior that is tolerated both in and outside of the workplace has 
changed drastically. 
One societal revolution at the forefront of this change in tolerated 
                                                     
240. Id. 
241. Id. ( In addition, both Tony and DaBay kept blue-colored mop-head dolls in their offices and 
had he dolls hanging from nooses hich ere ied aro nd he dolls  necks. ).  
242. Id. at 176. 
243. Id.  
244. Id. at 176 77. 
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workplace behavior is the #MeToo movement.245 The movement emerged 
in late 2017 and challenges workplace conduct that previously went 
unchecked.246 It encourages and empowers victims of workplace sexual 
harassment and abuse to come forward, and for organizations to re-
examine the issues plaguing their workplaces.247 One possible explanation 
for this shift is that workplace cultures in the 1970s paid insufficient 
attention to employee complaints about harassment. The movement has 
prompted state legislatures to re-evaluate certain legal standards and 
introduce new bills governing workplace conduct that limit certain types 
of speech and protect workers.248 Some of the new legislation altered the 
s andard ha  harassmen  m s  be considered severe or pervasive  o be 
a hostile work environment.249 Others extended legal protections against 
harassment beyond just employees to contractors, interns, volunteers, and 
students.250 The new legislation also aims to promote transparency when 
handling harassment claims by requiring certain employers or agencies to 
report investigations and settlements.251 Many states also considered 
requiring anti-harassment policies in the workplace, even though these are 
not required by federal law.252 Finally, some lawmakers tried to tighten 
employer liability for harassment in the workplace by ensuring they would 
be held legally responsible even if an individual did not make a 
                                                     
245. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1147 49 (2019). 
246. Id.; see #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIBUNE (July 2, 2020, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z9R4-WNHM].  
247. Sindhu Sundar, How #MeToo Is Changing Internal Investigations, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2018, 
9:17 PM EST), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2018/01/how_metoo_ 
is_changing_internal_investigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGM7-AWP9]. 
248. ANDREA JOHNSON ET AL., NAT L WOMEN S L. CTR., PROGRESS IN ADVANCING ME TOO 
WORKPLACE REFORMS IN #20STATESBY2020, at 2 (2019), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpath 
dns.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/20-States-By-2020-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNP7-6LA3] 
(noting that by the end of 2018, nearly 300 organizations and 300 state legislators from 40 states came 
together to call for strengthened protections against sexual harassment and violence in the workplace); 
id. ( [S] a e legisla ors ha e in rod ced aro nd 200 bills o s reng hen pro ec ions agains  orkplace 
harassment in the past two years, and to date, 15 states have passed ne  pro ec ions. ). While 
Congress has not passed substantive legislature on the issue, Senator Patty Murray and Representative 
Katherine Clark introduced the BE HEARD bill in an effort to address harassment in the workplace. 
Id. at 4 (citing BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, S. 1082, 116th Cong. (2019)).  
249. See CAL. GOV T CODE § 12923 (West 2020); Assemb. B. 8421, 2019 2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019).  
250. See H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018); S.B. 7507C, 
2017 2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018); H.B. 679, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019).  
251. See Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018, S.B. 1010, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B. 0075, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019).  
252. See S.B. 726, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); S.B. 6471, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2018); Vermont Act 183, H.707, 2017 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018).  
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complaint.253 These new laws hold employers liable for harassment by any 
supervisor with the power to make employment status decisions.254 
The #MeToo movement has empowered individuals to be less tolerant 
of abusive workplace environments and more comfortable reporting 
violations or harassing behaviors in the workplace. During 2018, the 
EEOC filed sixty-six lawsuits involving unlawful workplace harassment, 
and forty-one alleging sexual harassment.255 This was more than a 50% 
increase from the number of lawsuits filed the prior year, while the 
number of charges filed by employees alleging sexual harassment 
increased by over 12% from the prior year.256 Additionally, the EEOC 
found probable cause to believe that unlawful harassment had occurred in 
nearly 1,200 charges filed, a nearly 25% increase from 2017.257 These 
statistics demonstrate the growing intolerance for harassment in the 
workplace. In most orkplaces oda , he pre ailing reali ies  reflec  a 
commitment to preventing and rooting out discrimination that takes the 
form of se all  or raciall  profane or in imida ing speech. 258 
Similar to addressing issues of sexual harassment, new movements are 
also challenging socie s olerance of racial harassmen  in he orkplace. 
The Black Lives Matter movement, which began in 2016, is one example 
of a revolution that has put a spotlight on the racial inequity and injustice 
that permeates society.259 While this movement originated with a focus on 
racism within the criminal justice system, it has prompted a discussion 
regarding the ways in which racism arises in other areas of life, such as 
the workplace.260 In almos  e er  orkplace in America, [r]acial 
                                                     
253. See Assemb. B. 8421, 2019 2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).  
254. See H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 360, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018); H.B. 679, 2019 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019). These states expanded employer accountability for harassment by lower-level 
supervisors, counter to the Vance Supreme Court decision. That decision limited a victim s ability to 
recover under federal law when they experience sexual harassment by low-level supervisors (meaning 
employees without the ability to hire or fire). The Court refused to hold employers vicariously liable 
for the harassment of employees by low level supervisors. Many state courts follow federal law 
interpretations, like the Vance decision, when interpreting state harassment laws. See JOHNSON ET 
AL., supra note 248, at 11.  
255. What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment, EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM N (Oct. 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/preventing-
workplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/QKM5-WBPS]. 
256. Id. 
257. See id. 
258. Brief of Coal. for a Democratic Workforce as Amici Curie at 15, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 
N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinafter Democratic 
Workforce]. 
259. What We Believe, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/ 
[https://perma.cc/9M3B-RXRN]. 
260. Emily Peck, The Reckoning Over Workplace Racism Has Begun, HUFFPOST (June 9, 2020, 
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discrimina ion is a problem ha s b bbling nder he s rface. 261 For 
example, Mark Luckie, a former Facebook employee, wrote a statement 
about how the lack of Black representation at Facebook negatively 
impacts the work environment for Black employees and the experiences 
that the Black community has on Facebook.262 During his time at 
Facebook, he describes how Black employees frequently complained 
abo  co orkers and managers ho called hem aggressi e or hos ile for 
how they share their thoughts,  and abo  being accosted by campus 
security.263 By ignoring the mistreatment and marginalization of Black 
emplo ees, L ckie asser ed ha  Facebook s fe  Black emplo ees ill 
no  an  o remain a  he compan , hich in rn ma  undermine the 
quality and reach of [the] products. 264 Similar to the #MeToo movement, 
the Black Lives Matter movement will likely empower Black employees 
and other employees of color to share stories of mistreatment and protest 
racial harassment and inequities both in and outside the workplace.265 
Such a movement highlights the issues that the Black community may 
                                                     
5:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/like-me-too-but-for-racism_n_5edfee15c5b64843bde 
220d0 [https://perma.cc/8C9X-T6QD] ( Like they have been for years, Black people and other people 
of color are calling out not just police brutality, but also racism, discrimination, harassment and racial 
bias in he orkplace. ); Jon H man, Why #BlackLivesMatter Should Matter to Employers, 
WORKFORCE (July 13, 2016), https://www.workforce.com/news/why-blacklivesmatter-should-
matter-to-employers [https://perma.cc/W2G7-8BWT] ( If America is polarized over these issues, so 
are o r orkers. ). 
261. Arran Heal, Is Racial Discrimination the Next MeToo?, MEDIATE (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/heal-racial-discrimination.cfm [https://perma.cc/PW4J-USS7]. 
262. Jessica Guynn, Facebook Has a Problem With Black People, Former Employee Charges, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/27/facebook-has-
problem-black-people-former-employee-says/2126056002/ [https://perma.cc/9EQN-TLY8] ( Under 
pressure to make its workforce more closely resemble the more than 2 billion users it serves, Facebook 
increased the number of black employees to 4 percent of U.S. employees in 2018 from 2 percent in 
2016. Yet just 1 percent of technical roles are held by blacks and 2 percent of leadership roles. Black 
women account for an even smaller fraction of the workforce. Overall, Facebook employs 278 black 
women out of a U.S. workforce of just under 20,000. ).  
263. Id. Luckie also notes how black people here are scared of talking about the issues that affect 
hem beca se he  don  see his as a s ppor i e compan .  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
264. Id. 
265. Peck, supra note 260 ( The fo nder of lifes le re ailer Ban.Do, Jen Gotch, announced she 
would take a leave of absence after a former employee shared a detailed post describing both covert 
and overt racism at the company. The CEO of clothing company Reformation is also under fire after 
former employees spoke up about racism. A reckoning could be at hand. ); Jessica Guynn, 
Zuckerberg Reprimands Facebook Staff Defacing Black Lives Matter,  USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/25/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-black-lives-
matter-diversity/80933694/ [https://perma.cc/MC5S-ATQN]; Sam Wood, Jefferson Health Fires 
Employee Over Racist Facebook Post, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/20160715_A_racist_Facebook_post_leads_to_firing_of_Jef
ferson_employee.html [https://perma.cc/W5LU-66ZZ].  
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face if he  find hemsel es s bjec ed o he NLRB s an iq a ed 
standards. 
In the wake of these movements, even the NLRB appears to be aware 
that its precedent is outdated. In July 2020, after months of litigation and 
a flurry of amicus briefs urging the NLRB to overrule its precedent 
protecting profane and racially-charged outbursts,266 the NLRB issued its 
decision in General Motors LLC267 that acknowledged the tension 
between federal anti-discrimination la s and he NLRA s speech 
protections as applied to employees.268 The decision states that the NLRA 
is not meant to protect abusive conduct and, as such, the NLRB must 
interpret the NLRA in a way that allows employers to maintain a 
workplace free from harassment by other employees.269 However, the case 
focuses on the conduct of an employee union member. It does not address 
what if any right the employer has to refuse to interact with a non-
employee union representative so that it can keep its workplace 
harassment-free without violating its duty to bargain with the union. 
The NLRB has taken the first step in making a change, but there is a 
long a  o go o disman le he NLRB s pa ern of deciding cases 
seemingly without any consideration of employer liability under Title VII 
or he her he emplo ee s speech iola es Ti le VII.270 Much of the 
speech that the NLRB has protected may violate federal anti-
discrimination laws, as it would create a hostile work environment. The 
                                                     
266. See Press Release, Na l Lab. Rels. Bd., Board Invites Briefs Regarding NLRA Protection for 
Profane or Offensive Statements (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/board-invites-briefs-regarding-nlra-protection-for-profane-or-offensive 
[https://perma.cc/B4BV-HZJ8]. The Board invited interested parties to address five questions: (1) 
when should profane language or sexually or racially offensive speech lose the protection of the Act; 
(2) to what extent should the realities of industrial life protection of speech under the NLRA remain 
applicable with respect to profanity or language that is offensive to others on the basis of race or sex; 
(3) should the Board continue to take into account the norms of the workplace, like whether profanity 
is commonplace and tolerated, in determining whether an employee s outburst is unprotected; (4) 
should the Board continue to follow its previous standards to the extent it permitted a finding in those 
cases that racially or sexually offensive language did not lose the protection of the Act; and (5) [ ]ha  
relevance should the Board accord to antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII in determining whether 
an emplo ee s s a emen s lose he pro ec ion of he Ac ?  Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 
slip op. at 2 3 (Sept. 5, 2019) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) (describing the NLRB s 
notice and invitation to file briefs in the case). 
267. 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242). 
268. Id., slip op. at 6 8. 
269. Id., slip op. at 7 8. 
270. See supra Parts I, II, & III. In General Motors, he Board s a ed ha  he  o err le all per inent 
cases o he e en  ha  he  are inconsis en  i h his holding.  General Motors, slip op. at 2. 
However, this decision is the first of its kind, and it remains to be seen how this decision will be 
interpreted and applied in the future. 
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fact that the NLRB just issued the General Motors decision addressing 
how federal anti-discrimination laws relate to employee and union rights 
under the NLRA adds to the relevance of what this Comment seeks to 
address. Toda s socie  demands ha  he NLRA no longer shield he 
previously protected, egregious workplace behavior. 
IV. THE TIME IS RIPE FOR THE NLRB TO STOP PROTECTING 
HARASSING SPEECH 
NLRB precedent has protected employees engaged in union activities 
even if they use profanity and racially- or sexually-charged language that 
is wholly inappropriate in a modern workplace.271 The Board s s andards 
for assessing protected conduct under the NLRA have allowed the Act to 
become a shield for unlawful discrimination, inappropriate language, 
threats of violence, and racist speech.272 The Board has protected 
employees who have targeted coworkers based on their race or gender, 
with obscenity or violence, while ignoring the harm inflicted on the 
affected employees and the work environment. Its speech and bad faith 
bargaining standards have also shielded union representatives who create 
hostile environments while engaging in union work. Even though the 
Board has recognized that the differences in power between workers and 
employers can cause emotions to flare up during discussions about 
working conditions,273 this does not mean that conduct should be immune 
from repercussions. Union members are entitled to a wide range of 
freedom and latitude in their communication, but it should not be 
unlimited,274 something that even the NLRB recognizes.275 Now is the 
time for the NLRB to fully abandon its current understanding of bad faith 
bargaining and protected speech, and as this Comment outlines shape 
                                                     
271. See supra section III.C. Board law currently weighs so heavily in favor of protecting profane, 
sexually offensive, and racially offensive language that it can almost be deemed to promote such 
behavior.  Brief of USPS as Amicus Curiae at 1, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) 
(Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242). 
272. Michael H. LeRoy, Slurred Speech: How the NLRB Tolerates Racism, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & 
L. 209, 224 (2018). 
273. See Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 309 (1975). 
274. See supra Part I.  
275. See supra section I.B; Gen. Motors LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 8 (July 21, 2020) 
(Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) (noting that [a]b si e speech and cond c  (e.g., profane 
ad hominem attack or racial slur) is not protected by the Act and is differentiable from speech or 
conduct that is protected by Section 7 (e.g., articulating a concerted grievance or patrolling a picket 
line) ); see also Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 985 86 (2014) (Member Johnson, 
dissen ing) (no ing ha  emplo ees engaged in pro ec ed nion ac i i ies are permi ed some lee a  
o engage in o b rs s nder he NLRA, no  s bs an ial lee a , [] ma im m lee a , and cer ainl  
no  nres rained freedom ). 
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its decisions around the parameters for lawful workplace conduct 
established by federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the identity 
of the alleged harasser. Harmonizing federal anti-discrimination law and 
he NLRA s s andards for permissible orkplace nion speech ill enable 
employers to address offensive statements or conduct that may violate 
anti-discrimination laws. This, in turn, will enable the NLRB and courts 
o s rike a balance be een an emplo er s d  o compl  i h federal 
anti-discrimination laws and the NLRA, while still affording employees 
protection to engage in impassioned speech. 
A. Most NLRB Precedent Has Protected Conduct That Likely Violates 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law 
The Board s pre io s decisions, hich ha e pro ec ed emplo ees  
hateful, profane, or obscene speech, have signaled to union 
representatives and employees that the NLRA can be invoked as a shield 
against legitimate responses to such action.276 However, [i]  is bo h 
prepos ero s  and ins l ing o ensconce in o labor la  he ass mp ion 
ha  emplo ees are incapable of organi ing a nion or e ercising heir 
other statutory rights under the National Labor Relations Act without 
resor [ing] o ab si e or hrea ening lang age  arge ed a  a person s 
gender or race. 277 While its new decision in General Motors is a step in 
the right direction,278 the NLRB still has a long way to go to harmonize 
he NLRA s pro ec ion of nion represen a i e cond c  i h federal an i-
discrimination laws. 
Racist, sexist, and potentially violent speech is harmful to an 
emplo ee s righ  o a safe and discrimina ion-free workplace.279 
Addi ionall , inci ili  in he orkplace is often an antecedent to 
orkplace harassmen , as i  crea es a clima e of general derision and 
disrespec  in hich harassing beha iors are olera ed. 280 Racially or 
                                                     
276. As ario s organi a ions no ed in heir amic s briefs o he NLRB on his iss e, in he 21s  
cen r , an  aria ion on a she had i  coming  e cep ion is simpl  indefensible.  Democratic 
Workforce, supra note 258. 
277. Consol. Commc ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring) 
(citing Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).  
278. See supra section III.D. 
279. In 2016, an EEOC task force published a report investigating the nature and scope of 
workplace harassment. CHAI R. FELDBLUM AND VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT OF THE 
CO-CHAIRS (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-force-study-harassment-workplace 
[https://perma.cc/MU53-CALM]. The task force found that incivility in the workplace often leads to 
workplace harassment. Id. 
280. Id. at 55. 
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sexually offensive comments serve only to harm those to whom they are 
directed. 
The Board has held that employees who are engaged in protected 
ac i i ies generall  do no  lose he pro ec i e man le of he Ac  simpl  
beca se heir ac i i  con ra enes an emplo er s r les or policies. 281 But 
such a standard may render an employer helpless in maintaining a civil 
and discrimination-free workplace, exposing it to potential liability from 
ic ims of harassmen . The Board s decisions m s  all be bro gh  p o 
date with modern cultural and workplace norms. The Supreme Court has 
noted that the primary objective of Title VII is no  o pro ide redress b  
o a oid harm. 282 As he EEOC s gges s, an emplo er s d  o pre en  
or alle ia e harassmen  in he orkplace is bes  ser ed b  enco raging 
employees to complain of harassing conduct  before i  becomes 
actionable.283 Allowing employers to put policies in place that limit the 
possibility of workplace harassment would ideally prevent an actionable 
hostile work environment from developing.284 
B. Recommendations for Harmoni ing the NLRB s Decisions ith 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law 
The modern workplace demands that the Board stop excusing 
offensive, harassing language as incidental to the exercise of workplace 
rights in a confrontational or adversarial atmosphere. The Board must 
continue to harmonize its standards with federal anti-discrimination laws 
like Title VII because the NLRA should not preempt such laws.285 Instead, 
                                                     
281. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 21 (May 6, 2019) (citing Crowne 
Plaza LaGuardia, 357 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1101 (2011)). 
282. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
283. EEOC, supra note 159; see also Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (concluding that a Black employee suing an employer regarding a single, racially 
derogatory comment was able to establish a retaliation claim under Title VII). 
284. See Honda of Am. Mfg., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 748 (2001); Avondale Indus., 333 N.L.R.B. 622, 
637 38 (2001) (noting employer was justifiably concerned about the disruption that the employee s 
offensive speech would cause in the workplace).  
285. See Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2019); 
NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22; EEOC, supra note 159; Brief of Hum. Res. Pol y Ass n as 
Amicus Curiae, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-
208242) [hereinafter HR Policy]; S. S.S. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). The NLRB s General 
Counsel suggests that the NLRB should 
overrule its holdings in Plaza Auto, Pier Sixty, and Cooper Tire to the extent that they protect 
outbursts and statements that in and of themselves create or have the potential to create violence 
or a hostile work environment on the basis of a protected status such as race or gender. 
NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22.  
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conduct that rises to the level of harassment under Title VII, even if it does 
not reach the current standard for bad faith bargaining or unprotected 
speech, sho ld be considered o side he scope of he NLRA s 
protections.286 
The NLRA as no  in ended o be a ool o disable an emplo er s 
ability to discipline its employees, maintain a harassment-free workplace, 
or keep its bargaining team members safe; using it in such a manner 
corrupts its purpose.287 The S preme Co r  has long held ha  the Board 
has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor 
Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and 
equally important Congressional objectives. 288 For example, as discussed 
above in Constellium, the NLRB concluded that the employer violated the 
NLRA hen i  ermina ed an emplo ee ho ro e wh*re board  on he 
overtime signup sheets.289 However, on appeal to the Federal Court of 
Appeals for he D.C. Circ i , he co r  ref sed o phold he Board s 
decision.290 The Co r  concl ded ha  hile he NLRB s decision did not 
impermissibly depart from precedent without explana ion,  he Board 
failed, ho e er, o address he po en ial conflic  be een i s 
in erpre a ion of he NLRA and [ he emplo er s] obliga ions nder s a e 
                                                     
286. S ch a s andard o ld be in line i h he Board s pre io s ackno ledgemen s ha  an 
emplo ee s offensi e and personall  denigra ing remarks alone can res l  in loss of pro ec ion [ nder 
he NLRA].  Pla a A o C r., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 286, 293 94 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Indian 
Hills Care Ctr., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996) (noting that there are situations in which vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language directed at supervisor or employer, uttered in the course of protected 
union activity, may lose protection of the Act). 
287. See NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22; EEOC, supra note 159 ( Gi en ha  emplo ers 
must address racist or sexist conduct that violates Title VII, and may need to do so even before the 
conduct becomes actionable in order to avoid liability for negligence, the EEOC urges the NLRB to 
consider a standard that permits employers to address such conduct, including by disciplining 
emplo ees, as appropria e. ); HR Polic , supra note 285 (all noting that the NLRA should not 
preempt federal anti-discrimination laws).  
288. S. S.S., 316 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added); see also Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 
535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002) ( Since So hern S.S. Co., e ha e accordingl  ne er deferred o he 
Board s remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and 
policies unrelated to the NLRA. Thus, we have precluded the Board from enforcing orders found in 
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, rejected claims that federal antitrust policy should defer to the 
NLRA, and precluded the Board from selecting remedies pursuant to its own interpretation of the 
Interstate Commerce Act . . . . The So hern S.S. Co. line of cases es ablished ha  here he Board s 
chosen remedy trenches upon a federal s a e or polic  o side he Board s compe ence o adminis er, 
he Board s remed  ma  be req ired o ield.  (citations omitted)); NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 
F.3d 528, 530 32 (8th Cir. 1996) (denying enforcement of NLRB decision which had found a 
picketer s conduct protected under the Act where he carried a sign saying Who is Rhonda F [with 
an X through F] Sucking Today? ). 
289. Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (July 24, 2018). 
290. Constellium, 945 F.3d at 548 49. 
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and federal eq al emplo men  oppor ni  la s. 291 The Court remanded 
the case for the Board to address he conflic  be een he emplo er s 
obligation to maintain a harassment-free workplace and its ability to 
discipline the employee under the Act.292 Accordingly, while the Board is 
legall  req ired o balance emplo ee s righ s nder he NLRA agains  he 
righ  o a safe orkplace free of discrimina ion, he Board has erl  
failed o [do] so. 293 In General Motors, the Board acknowledged that the 
NLRA sho ld no  con in e o read he Ac  o empo er he Board o 
referee what abusive conduct is severe enough for an employer to lawfully 
discipline. [The NLRA s] d  is o pro ec  emplo ees from in erference 
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. 294 
For employers to prevent actionable hostile work environments and 
alleviate themselves of liability related to their duty to bargain, they must 
be able to act in response to inappropriate behavior that may support a 
hostile work environment claim even when it occurs in conjunction with 
union activity. Currently, in situations where union conduct directed at 
members of the management team may constitute harassment under 
Title VII, an employer that refuses to continue bargaining may face an 
unfair labor practice penalty.295 Because General Motors did not analyze 
ho  an emplo er can address a nonemplo ee s beha ior hile complying 
i h i s o her NLRA obliga ions, a nion represen a i e s offensi e 
conduct would still be analyzed under the outdated bad faith bargaining 
standard i ho  d e considera ion o he emplo er s righ s and 
obligations under federal anti-discrimination laws. However, by fully 
harmonizing Title VII and the NLRA, employers will be able to protect 
their employees from a hostile work environment and avoid liability under 
Title VII, without fear of violating the NLRA for refusing to bargain.296 
Because Title VII requires employers to actively prevent and stop 
unlawful harassment,297 employers must be able to protect their 
employees by nipping in he b d  he kinds of emplo ee cond c  ha  
co ld lead o a hos ile orkplace  before an ac ionable hos ile 
                                                     
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22. 
294. See Gen. Motors LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 8 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA-
197985 and 14-CA-208242) 
295. See supra section II.D. 
296. See supra Part II; c.f. Victoria Packing Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (2000) (citing Sahara 
Datsun, 278 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1986)). 
297. See supra section III.A. 
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workplace is created.298 Without congruence between the laws, the 
employer faces a dilemma it is unable to insulate itself from liability 
under both federal and state law for failing to maintain a harassment-free 
workplace without also risking an unfair labor practice charge.299 To 
eliminate this possibility, the Board should give deference and 
considera ion o an emplo er s d ies nder federal an i-discrimination 
la  hen de ermining if he NLRA pro ec s a nion member s federall  
unlawful conduct. This deference should be given irrespective of whether 
the union member is an employee or union representative, or whether the 
cond c  occ rs i hin he scope of he par ies  o her righ s and obliga ions 
under the Act. 
Al ho gh some organi a ions ha e oiced concerns abo  [g]raf ing a 
code of etiquette onto the NLRA 300 that may be used to quell pro-union 
activity,301 this perspective fails to acknowledge the change in 
circumstances for determining appropriate workplace conduct since the 
twentieth century.302 An employer cannot weaponize Title VII to quell 
pro-union activity because it requires that employer discipline be 
appropriately tailored to preventing or ending the workplace harassment. 
Moreover, even under Title VII, courts have admonished that the law is 
no  a civility code. 303 Rather, conduct is only actionable under Title VII 
when it is objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive, based on 
protected characteristics, and is severe or pervasive.304 A union employee 
ho feels ha  he emplo er s response o he ac ion as no  reasonably 
consistent with preventing Title VII violations might seek relief from the 
NLRB on the grounds that the response was instead motivated by anti-
union sentiments. Assuming that the conduct did not immediately rise to 
                                                     
298. NLRB General Counsel, supra note 22. 
299. See Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
see also Consol. Commc ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring) 
( Conduct that is designed to humiliate and intimidate another individual because of and in terms of 
ha  person s gender or race sho ld be naccep able in he ork en ironmen . F ll s op. ). 
300. Brief of Liuna Mid-Atl. Reg l Org. Coal. as Amici Curiae, Gen. Motors LLC, 368 N.L.R.B. 
No. 68 (2017) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242) [hereinaf er Li na] ( [E]nac ing a code of 
etiquette onto the NLRA would be inconsistent with the modern cultural trends and long-standing 
industrial reality. Everything from the popularity of adult-themed television to the frequently course 
and profane language from the current President demonstrates that profane language is becoming 
more accepted in everyday life, not less . . . . ).  
301. Liuna, supra note 300; Brief of The Am. Fed. of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amici 
Curiae, Gen. Motors, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242). 
302. Liuna, supra note 300; Brief of Nat l Nurses United as Amicus Curiae, Gen. Motors, 368 
N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242). 
303. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
304. See supra Part III. 
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the level of severe conduct, employers should be expected to impose 
proportionate consequences that do not unduly impose upon union 
emplo ees  or represen a i es  abili  o engage in nion ac i i ies. 
Employees would still be able to express emotions during bargaining and 
other discussions on workplace conditions, but in a manner that does not 
create a hostile work environment under Title VII. 
Federal anti-discrimination law is not wholly distinct from the NLRA; 
both are pieces of the larger puzzle that is labor and employment law. 
Following General Motors, the Board must continue to align its decisions 
regarding bo h emplo ee and nion represen a i e s pro ec ed speech 
under the Act with the standards defining hostile work environments 
under federal anti-discrimination law. Because the Supreme Court has 
pre io sl  held ha  he Board s r lings canno  iola e federal la ,305 the 
harmonization that this Comment calls for will require the Board to shape 
its rulings around the parameters for lawful workplace conduct and 
employer behavior set forth under federal anti-discrimination laws.306 
Likewise, such harmonizing would not allow an employer to terminate 
employees for all offensive conduct. Many instances of profanity or crude 
behavior are not actionable under Title VII,307 and that same behavior 
would remain protected under the NLRA. As a result, even if Title VII 
governed conduct in the workplace alongside the NLRA, there remains 
room for passionate advocacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the years, the NLRB has deployed the NLRA as a shield to protect 
union members from discipline for conduct that would otherwise violate 
federal anti-discrimination laws. Under NLRB precedent, employers and 
unions may be forced to continue to bargain with a party who engages in 
harassment that is actionable under Title VII, or risk an unfair labor 
practice charge because the conduct does not constitute bad faith 
bargaining. However, an employer does not have to and should not have 
to wait to act until conduct reaches unlawfulness under the NLRA in 
                                                     
305. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144, 147 (2002). 
306. This is something that even the Board itself acknowledged that it should be doing, specifically 
when analyzing an employee s protected union speech under the Act. See Gen. Motors, 369 N.L.R.B. 
No. 127 (July 21, 2020) (Cases 14-CA-197985 and 14-CA-208242). 
307. Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2008) ( But while no one condones boorishness, 
there is a line between what can justifiably be called sexual harassment and what is merely crude 
behavior. Profanity, while regrettable, is something of a fact of daily life. Flatulence, while offensive, 
is no  of en ac ionable, for Ti le VII is no  a general ci ili  code.  The occasional off-color joke or 
comment is a missive few of us escape. Were such things the stuff of lawsuits, we would be litigating 
past sundown in ever so many circumstances.  (citations omitted)). 
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order to avoid liability. Harmonizing the NLRA and federal anti-
discrimination laws would spare employers from inconsistent obligations, 
especially during bargaining. Employers would be able to take affirmative 
and effective steps, in compliance with their Title VII obligations, to 
prevent or stop conduct that would lead to a hostile work environment. 
Title VII s correc i e ac ion s andard, hich has been in erpre ed o 
include a proportionality aspect, can provide guidance in evaluating 
workplace conduct under the NLRA to ensure that employers are not 
overreacting and taking severe action in response to actions that are 
neither severe nor pervasive under Title VII. 
Ultimately, this Comment proposes a standard that balances protecting 
orkers  and nion represen a i es  righ s nder he NLRA b  pro iding 
some leeway for inappropriate outbursts associated with union activity, 
and letting employers enforce their own workplace policies to promote a 
healthier, more prosperous work environment. The NLRB has taken the 
first step in remedying the harm created by its past precedent, but needs 
o con in e harmoni ing i s s andards i h par ies  respec i e d ies nder 
the Act and their rights and obligations under federal anti-discrimination 
laws, across all contexts and actors. 
 
